资源机会成本视角下如何健全生态补偿机制——以国有林区停伐补偿中的福利倒挂问题为例  

How to Improve Ecological Compensation Mechanism from the Perspective of Resource Opportunity Cost?ACase Study Based on “Welfare Upside Down” of Forest Resources Compensation in State-owned ForestAreas

作　　者：袁婉潼 乔丹 柯水发[1] 侯强 严如贺 YUAN Wantong;QIAO Dan;KE Shuifa;HOU Qiang;YAN Ruhe

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院 [2]长白山森林工业集团天然林保护管理部 [3]农业农村部规划设计研究院农业农村区域发展研究所

出　　处：《中国农村观察》2022年第2期59-78,共20页China Rural Survey

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“基于职工福利提升视角的深化重点国有林区改革研究”(项目编号:19BGL161)的资助。

摘　　要：健全生态补偿机制是推进生态文明建设的重要任务,但目前生态补偿机制仍然在“补什么”“补给谁”“补多少”问题上缺乏明确理论依据。本文构建了资源机会成本识别不充分导致福利倒挂的理论分析框架,在此基础上,通过对国有林区全面停止天然林商业性采伐后生态补偿的案例分析,展示了采运职工和加工职工两个群体福利水平格局发生反转的过程,总结了从资源机会成本视角健全生态补偿机制的原因、内涵和路径。研究表明,第一,认知不足、财政补贴资金不足、相关主体间协调不足导致现有生态补偿没有充分识别资源机会成本。第二,在资源机会成本识别不充分情形下,生态补偿作为外生政策冲击会打破初始的福利水平格局,资源利用链条前端的采运群体因得到补偿,福利水平上升,而资源利用链条后端的加工群体因不能继续从事木材加工业且难以获得充足补偿,福利水平下降,不再高于采运群体,由此形成了福利倒挂。据此,本文从资源机会成本视角明晰了“补什么”“补给谁”“补多少”的问题,提出充分识别资源机会成本是健全生态补偿机制的方向。Improving ecological compensation mechanism is an important task to promote the construction of ecological civilization. However, ecological compensation mechanism is still imperfect right now, which is mainly reflected in a lack of clear theoretical and policy basis on the issues of “what to pay”, “pay to whom” and “how much to pay”. This article constructs a theoretical framework of analysis based on welfare-upside-down problem caused by insufficient identification of resource opportunity cost. Based on the framework, through the case analysis of the logging ban of natural forests in state-owned forest areas,this study shows the process of development reversal of welfare level pattern of mining, transportation and processing groups.Meanwhile, from the perspective of resource opportunity cost, it summarizes the reasons, connotation and paths to improve the ecological compensation mechanism. The research shows that, first, insufficient cognition, limited policy funds and insufficient coordination of relevant subjects lead to the fact that existing ecological compensation has not fully identified the opportunity cost of resources. Specifically, it only pays attention to the groups at the front of the resource utilization chain and ignores the groups at the back of the resource utilization chain. Second, under the background of insufficient identification of resource opportunity cost, the exogenous policy impact of ecological compensation will break the initial welfare level pattern, visibly causing welfare reversal. It finds that the mining and transportation groups at the front end of resource utilization chain obtain a higher welfare level due to compensation, while the processing groups at the back end of resource utilization chain will decline due to inability to continue to engage in the wood processing industry and difficulty in obtaining sufficient compensation. Consequently, their original relatively high welfare level will be reversed obviously. This discrimination on ecological payment made t

关 键 词：生态补偿 资源机会成本 福利倒挂 天然林禁伐 国有林区 

分 类 号：F326.23[经济管理—产业经济]