基于博弈理论的跨域水体联治府际行为研究——以太湖流域为例  

Research on inter-government behavior of inter-regional water system joint governance based on game theory——Taking Taihu Lake Basin as an example

作　　者：王佳琦 毛春梅[1] WANG Jiaqi;MAO Chunmei(School of Public Administration,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China)

机构地区：[1]河海大学公共管理学院,江苏南京211100

出　　处：《环境保护科学》2022年第2期116-120,共5页Environmental Protection Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(20AGL036);中央高校基本科研业务费(学生项目)(B210203019)。

摘　　要：为探究府际合作行为与成本收益之间的因果关系,发掘跨域合作治理困境的内生原因。以太湖流域水体联治为例,梳理流域行政区划分属江苏省、浙江省、安徽省以及上海市三省一市协作主体的角色定位和利益诉求,采用博弈理论与方法构建府际合作治理博弈矩阵,拆解政府策略选择的内在利益逻辑。研究表明:合作主体因发展基础差异化面临多元利益矛盾局面,成本收益核算是地方政府行为的主要影响因素,横向机制的介入有利于引导和规范政府合作行为。为此,应构建以利益诱因、利益共享、利益补偿以及利益联结为主的协调机制框架,满足流域环境可持续治理的需要,实现府际互利共赢、长效共治。In order to explore the causal relationship between inter-governmental cooperation behavior and cost-benefit and analyze the endogenous reasons for the dilemma of inter-regional cooperative governance, the joint governance of the Taihu Lake Basin is selected as an example. The role positioning and interest demands among the three provinces and one city are investigated,which are Jiangsu Province, Zhejiang Province, Anhui Province, and Shanghai. The game theory and methods are used to construct a game matrix for inter-government cooperation governance. The inherent interest logic of the government strategic choice is obtained.The research shows that the cooperative entities are facing a situation of multiple interest contradictions due to the differentiation of the development basis. Cost-benefit accounting is the main influencing factor of the local government behavior. The horizontal mechanisms is conducive to guiding and regulating the government cooperation behaviors. The framework of a coordination mechanism based on benefit sharing, benefit compensation, and benefit linkage is eastablished to achieve the mutual benefit and long-term co-governance among governments, leading to a sustainable environmental governance in the river basin.

关 键 词：跨域水污染 博弈理论 府际行为 府际治理 太湖流域 

分 类 号：X524[环境科学与工程—环境工程]