小微企业信贷配给的产生机制、根源及缓解路径——基于不完全信息动态博弈视角的分析  

Generation Mechanism, Origin and Alleviating Path of Credit Rationing of Small and Micro Enterprises——From the Perspective of Dynamic Game of Incomplete Information

作　　者：王雁飞 周茂清[2] Wang Yanfei;Zhou Maoqing(University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 102488,China;Institute of Finance and Banking,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100710,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院大学,北京102488 [2]中国社会科学院金融研究所,北京100710

出　　处：《西北民族大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2022年第2期115-121,共7页Journal of Northwest Minzu University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“中国地方政府债务与金融稳定性研究”(项目编号:20&ZD082)。

摘　　要：为探究小微企业信贷配给问题的成因,基于微观主体的博弈视角,构建银企不完全信息动态博弈模型,通过求解博弈树中的均衡解,阐释银企双方行为相互作用而导致小微企业信贷配给,通过分析每个子博弈中决策主体改变决策所需的条件,探寻法律制度、担保体系、信用环境、银行业市场结构、银行自身经营模式等对决策行为的影响,使小微企业和银行分别选择“不申请”“不放贷”的决策,根据动态博弈分析情况提出缓解小微企业信贷配给的政策建议。In order to probe into the causes of credit rationing problems of small and micro enterprises, from the game perspective of micro subjects, the article constructs a model of dynamic game of incomplete information of banks and enterprises, tries to work out the equilibrium solutions in the game tree, and interprets the credit rationing of small and micro enterprises caused by the mutual impact of banks and enterprises. Through the analysis of the conditions for the decision change of decision subjects in each subgame, the article explores the impact on decision behavior by the legal system, credit guarantee system, credit environment, bank market structure, bank operation modes, etc.,which makes enterprises and banks choose “not to apply for” or “not to make loans”. Based on the analysis of dynamic game, the article puts forward policy suggestions to alleviate the credit rationing of small and micro enterprises.

关 键 词：小微企业 信贷配给 不完全信息 动态博弈 生产机制 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]