面向共同CM时具搭便车行为OEM的流程投资策略  

Process investment strategies for free riding OEMs that face a common CM

作　　者：夏晶[1] 牛文举 沈厚才[1] Xia Jing;Niu Wenju;Shen Houcai(Department of Management Science and Engineering,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China;School of Marketing and Logistics Management,Nanjing University of Finance&Economics,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]南京大学管理科学与工程系,江苏南京210093 [2]南京财经大学营销与物流管理学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2022年第1期130-144,共15页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71901116,71671085,71571096);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71732003)。

摘　　要：考虑两个竞争OEM能够在共同CM处搭对方的流程投资便车时,它们的最优投资策略选择问题.采用博弈论的方法建立了四种情形下的模型,分析了搭便车系数、产品初始生产成本和产品替代程度等对流程投资博弈均衡的影响.研究表明,产品初始生产成本之差高时,拥有成本优(劣)势的OEM会成为唯一投资方(搭便车者).产品初始生产成本之差低时:若搭便车系数小,两个OEM都投资;若搭便车系数中等,二者都投资或者都不投资;否则,它们都不投资.均衡状态下,共同投资既有可能使一方获利另一方受损,也有可能实现帕累托改进,亦或形成“囚徒困境”.存在多个阈值,OEM会依据产品初始生产成本之差以及产品替代程度与相应阈值的大小调整流程投资策略.This paper develops four models based on game theory,and analyzes the effects of free-riding factor,product substitutability,and the difference of the initial production costs on investment equilibria to explore whether two competing OEMs should make process investments in a common CM when they free ride on each other’s investment.The results show that if the difference of the initial production costs is high,the OEM with a cost advantage(disadvantage) will be the unique investor(free-rider).When the difference of the initial production costs is low,if the free-riding factor is low,both OEMs invest;if the free-riding factor is medium,they jointly invest or exit;and neither party invests otherwise.In equilibrium,joint investments may cause a party win and the other lose,or lead to a Pareto improvement or a prisoners’ dilemma outcome.Moreover,there are several thresholds such that the OEMs should adjust the investment strategies by comparing them with the difference of the initial production costs and product substitutability.

关 键 词：供应链管理 流程投资 搭便车 竞合 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]