基于用户可再生能源偏好的电力市场需求响应模型  

A Demand Response Model Based on User's Renewable Energy Preference

作　　者：段金鹏 代业明[2] 齐尧 赵佩 DUAN Jinpeng;DAI Yeming;QI Yao;ZHAO Pei(School of Mathematics and Statistics,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China;School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266071,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学数学与统计学院,山东青岛266071 [2]青岛大学商学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《工业工程》2022年第2期146-154,共9页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72171126);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(20YJA630009);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2016M602104);青岛市博士后应用研究资助项目(2016033);2018青岛大学创新型教学实验室研究项目资助(34)。

摘　　要：为更好地促进可再生能源在零售市场的消纳,针对含有孤岛型混合可再生能源电力系统(island hybrid renewable energy system,IHRES)的零售市场,在考虑用户具有可再生能源电力偏好基础上,利用Stackelberg主从博弈模型研究传统售电商、IHRES和居民用户之间的电力需求响应问题,通过分布式迭代算法求解售电侧非合作博弈纳什均衡解和用户侧唯一全局最优解,证明Stackelberg主从博弈纳什均衡的存在性。仿真结果验证了算法收敛性,同时也表明两类售电商定价策略随着用户偏好变化呈相反变化趋势。随着用户偏好的提升,可以有效促进可再生能源在电力市场中的消纳,并保证电力负荷稳定。With the gradual opening of electricity retail market and the rapid development of renewable energy power generation,the consumption of renewable energy has become a hot issue.To promote the consumption of renewable energy in the retail market,a Stackelberg game model among traditional power retailer,island hybrid renewable energy system(IHRES)and multiple users is established to research the demand response.Meanwhile the influence of users'renewable energy preference on the results is considered.The existence of non-cooperative game equilibrium on the retail side and the unique global optimal solution of the user side is proved,and the Stackelberg game equilibrium is obtained.A distributed iterative algorithm is proposed to solve the resident user's optimal power demand and the retailer's optimal pricing strategy in the equilibrium state.The simulation results verify the convergence of proposed algorithm,and show that the pricing strategies of the two types of power retailers appear in an opposite trend with the change of user preference.In addition,with the improvement of user preference,it can effectively promote the consumption of renewable energy in the electricity market and ensure the stability of power load.

关 键 词：智能电网 可再生能源 需求响应 STACKELBERG博弈 非合作博弈 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] TM73[理学—数学]