网络外部性下E-商务平台IT投资决策仿真研究  

Simulation of IT Investment Decision for E-comerce Platform under Network Externality

作　　者：杨舒桦 李莉[2] YANG Shu-hua;LI Li(School of Computer,Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing Jiangsu 210094,China;School of Economics and management Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing Jiangsu 210094,China)

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学计算机学院,江苏南京210094 [2]南京理工大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210094

出　　处：《计算机仿真》2022年第2期240-245,共6页Computer Simulation

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(717711122)。

摘　　要：在Netlogo仿真软件基础上,基于双寡头电子商务平台序贯投资决策博弈模型,设计包含电子商务平台市场环境、事件和主体的仿真系统,调整相关环境变量和各类主体属性参数,观察竞争平台的价格、收益等变化。仿真研究结果发现,先后进入市场的双寡头平台竞争优势由技术进步水平和转移成本的相对大小所决定,当技术进步水平较高时后进入平台具有后动质量优势,反之,先进入平台能够通过构建进入壁垒锁定用户而获得先动优势,网络外部性的存在会扩大竞争差距。但后进入平台和先进入平台完全兼容时,则可以通过更高质量的服务扩大市场份额,在竞争中的优势地位。On the basis of the duopoly sequential investment decision-making game model of B2 B platm, we designed a simulation system where the agent, event and market environment of competitive e-platform market were described. Netlogo simulation modeling was carried out to analyze the effect of the related environment variables and attribute parameters of agents. The results indicate that the competitive advantage of duopoly platform depends on whether the information technology improvement is high or low relative to the extent of switching cost. When the level of technical progress is higher, the later entrant has the advantage of high-quality. Otherwise, early entrant can have the advantage by building barriers and locking users. The existence of network externalities can widen the gap of competitiveness advantage between two e-platforms. Once succeeded in conducting compatible strategy with early entrant, the later entrant can attract more users with higher platform quality and seize the dominant position in the competition.

关 键 词：网络外部性 电子商务平台 投资决策 仿真 

分 类 号：TP391.9[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]