建筑业“工程分包困局”初探——为什么要超越古典政治经济学?  

Preliminary Exploration into the Dilemma of Subcontracting in the Construction Industry:Why Is It Necessary to Go Beyond Classical Political Economics?

作　　者：华冬冬[1] 亓霞[1] 沙凯逊[1] HUA Dongdong;QI Xia;SHA Kaixun(Shandong Jianzhu University,Jinan 250014,China)

机构地区：[1]山东建筑大学,山东济南250014

出　　处：《建筑经济》2022年第4期5-9,共5页Construction Economy

基　　金：山东省住房城乡建设科技计划项目“全过程工程咨询服务模式研究”(2020-R3-7);山东建筑大学基金项目“建设项目治理研究”(00006021441)。

摘　　要：以我国建筑业面临的“工程分包困局”为背景探析相关的理论问题。古典政治经济学的分工理论和比较优势理论可以很好地解释专业化分工的经济合理性,但是对“反命题”的解释能力不足。为了对这一困局作出合理的解释,需要引进交易成本的概念。走出这一困局,不仅需要公共制序(政府规制和法律手段),而且需要私人制序(公司治理和项目治理)。Taking the dilemma of subcontracting in China’s construction industry as the background,relevant theoretical issues are explored.The theory of labor division and the law of comparative advantage of classical political economics can successfully explain the economic validity of specialized division of labor,but have insufficient explanatory power for the ‘contrary proposition’.In order to make a convincing explanation for the predicament,it is essential to introduce the concept of transaction cost.To get out of the dilemma requires not only public ordering(government regulations and legal means),but also private ordering(corporate governance and project governance).

关 键 词：工程分包 分工理论 比较优势 交易成本 私人制序 

分 类 号：TU71[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]