碳税机制下考虑不同低碳策略的动态博弈模型及复杂性研究  

Research on Dynamic Game Model and Complexity Considering Different Low-carbon Strategies under Carbon Tax Mechanism

作　　者：郑清 阿布都热合曼·卡的尔 ZHENG Qing;AR Budureheman·Kader(School of Information Management, Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics, Urumqi, 830012, China)

机构地区：[1]新疆财经大学信息管理学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830012

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2022年第4期55-60,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71462029);新疆高校科研计划自然科学重点项目(XJEDU2019I023);新疆维吾尔自治区研究生科研创新项目(XJUFE2020K045)。

摘　　要：考虑碳排放税,建立双寡头制造商分别实施废品回收和绿色低碳广告投入策略的动态博弈模型。通过系统稳定域,分岔图,功率谱等分析了博弈模型纳什均衡解处的稳定性及参数对系统稳定域的影响,同时对系统的复杂性特征进行了研究。结果表明,消费者回收价格敏感性增加会使整个系统稳定域缩小,而绿色低碳广告投入水平增加只会使实施该策略的企业自身稳定域扩大;当制造商价格调整速度过快时,系统会进入混沌状态;混沌状态下,对比实施广告策略的制造商,实施废品回收策略的制造商价格调整行为对市场造成的震荡更大。最后使用反馈控制策略对系统混沌状态进行了有效的控制,研究结果对制造商低碳策略选择及价格决策有着较好的借鉴意义。The paper establishes the dynamic game model in which duopoly manufacturers implement waste recycling and green low-carbon advertising investment strategies,under carbon emission tax.The system stability region,bifurcation diagram,power spectrum and other methods are used to analyze the stability of the Nash equilibrium solution on the game model,and the influence of parameters on the system stability region.We study the complexity characteristics of the system.The results show an increasein the sensitivity of consumer recycling prices can reduce the stability of the entire system,and an increasein the level of low-carbon advertising can only expand the stability of the self.Too fast adjustment speed of price can make the system enter in chaos.Further,compared with manufacturers who implement advertising strategies,another price adjusting can cause greater market turbulence.Finally,the feedback control strategy is used to control the system chaos.

关 键 词：碳排放税 闭环供应链 动态博弈 复杂性分析 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F274