股权“竞价融资”与“主动寻求融资”的融资绩效比较——基于不完全信息博弈视角  

Comparison of financing performance between“bidding type financing”and“proactive financing seeking”:From the perspective of incomplete-information game

作　　者：董礼 陈金龙[1] DONG Li;CHEN Jinlong(Business School,Huaqiao University,Quanzhou 362021,China)

机构地区：[1]华侨大学工商管理学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2022年第3期179-188,共10页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571074)。

摘　　要：非上市公司在寻求股权融资的过程中,融资对象、融资方式及融资契约设计对企业融资成功概率和融资绩效产生重要影响。大疆公司的“竞价融资”是近年来我国私募股权融资领域的一大创举。以大疆公司“竞价融资”为背景,本文运用博弈方法构建了信息不对称情形下融资企业与股权投资者之间、股权投资者与股权投资者之间的投融资博弈模型,从理论上探讨股权“竞价融资”与“主动寻求融资”的融资绩效差异。研究结果表明,两种融资方式的融资绩效孰高孰低是不确定的,受到融资中介费用、谈判的机会成本、市场对股权的估值区间等因素影响。数值模拟结果显示,虽然不能直接判断两种融资方式的融资绩效孰高孰低,但“竞价融资”的融资绩效在大多数情况下高于“主动寻求融资”。研究结论可为企业选择融资方式提供一定的参考价值。Equity financing is a crucial financing method for enterprises.Numerous enterprises have sought financing through initial public offering(IPO)but have been hindered by stringent IPO conditions.Because of the rapid development of China′s capital market,private equity financing has become an important financing method before IPOs by numerous enterprises.In recent years,DJ-Innovations first launches a equity bidding type financing activity of USD 1 billion,surprising the investment and business communities.The equity bidding type financing activity held by DJ-Innovations transforms the dominant relationship between investors and those who finance for investment.This study uses DJ-Innovations′equity bidding type financing as the background to construct game models for equity bidding type financing and proactive financing seeking.In addition,this study combines the two models and compares the financing performances of the two financing methods,in order to provide a reference for enterprises′financing-related decision-making.This study employs the idea of auction game to construct a game model of equity bidding type financing.In addition,this study adopts Rubinstein′s rotational bargaining game theory to construct a game model of proactive financing seeking,and from the perspective of enterprises that finance for their investment,analyzes whether the performance of equity bidding type financing is superior to that of proactive financing seeking.We draw an abstract concept from reality and construct two incomplete-information game models in two situations under several premises.One model is the game model of equity bidding type financing that uses the equity bidding type financing launched by DJ-Innovations as the background.In this model,the game subjects are two investment institutions that bid for equities offered by the enterprise.In the other model,the enterprise proactively seeks funds from investors,and the game subjects are the enterprise and two investment institutions.In both models,the game subjects h

关 键 词：股权融资 竞价融资 主动寻求融资 融资绩效 博弈论 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学] F224