保险合同诉讼和行政处罚:基于大数据研究  

Insurance Contract Lawsuits and Administrative Penalties: A Research Based on Big Data

作　　者：郭锐欣[1] 周娟[1] 王影 GUO Rui-xin;ZHOU Juan;WANG Ying

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学保险学院 [2]泰康人寿科技创新中心

出　　处：《保险研究》2022年第2期64-78,共15页Insurance Studies

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(20YJA790017);对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(19YB23)的资助。

摘　　要：本文基于2014年1月到2019年10月保险合同诉讼大数据,从两个方面深入研究中国保险合同诉讼特征及保险公司被诉风险。一方面,结合监管部门公布的保险投诉数据,从司法调解成功率、保险合同诉讼案由结构变化等角度揭示保险合同诉讼存在的六个重要特征。另一方面,从监管部门2014~2018年公开的行政处罚文本中提取出受处罚主体,建立保险公司层面的面板数据,探寻行政处罚力度对保险公司被诉风险的影响。研究发现,中资人身保险公司的被诉风险与行政处罚呈现正相关,结合保险合同诉讼特征,本文认为中资人身保险公司存在“重业务轻合规”粗放式管理模式,保险监管部门应当加大对其销售环节反复出现的违规行为的处罚力度。Based on the big data of insurance contract lawsuits from January 2014 to October 2019 in China, this article discussed the characteristics of insurance contract lawsuits and the risk of insurance company being sued.On the one hand, based on the insurance complaint data released by the insurance regulatory authority, it revealed six important characteristics of insurance contract lawsuits from the aspects of judicial mediation success rate and the structural change of the causes of action.On the other hand, we obtained the penalized insurance company data by text extraction from the administrative penalty documents from 2014 to 2018,and established the panel data on the insurance company level.Then we made a research on the influence of the administrative penalty intensity on the risk of insurance company being sued.We find that the lawsuit risk of Chinese life insurance companies is positively correlated with administrative penalty.These insurers tend to emphasize business development at the expense of regulation compliance.The current intensity of administrative penalty is not enough to stimulate them to change the extensive management mode.

关 键 词：保险合同诉讼 保险投诉 行政处罚 粗放式管理 

分 类 号：F842[经济管理—保险]