基于三方博弈模型的电商平台合谋监管制度设计  

Design of Collusion Supervision System of E-Commerce Platform Based on Tripartite Game Model

作　　者：张文浩 张峥[1] ZHANG Wen-hao;ZHANG Zheng(University of Shanghai for Science and Technology School of Management,Shanghai 200093,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《经济研究导刊》2022年第12期153-155,共3页Economic Research Guide

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71371124)。

摘　　要：在B2C电子商务平台中,商家与消费者之间存在的信息不对称问题日趋严重。商家利用双方信息不对称,采取以假乱真、虚标价格等欺诈投机行为,达到竞争中取胜的目的。并且,目前B2C电子商务平台对商家的不良行为未建立有效的监管机制。鉴于此,运用三方博弈模型,对商家、电子商务平台与政府的行为进行分析,发现对合谋行为加大观测力度和惩罚力度是消除电子商务平台与商家合谋行为的关键,可借助制度工程学的关键理论——孙氏图,对B2C电子商务平台的监管制度给出设计建议。In B2C E-commerce platform,the problem of information asymmetry is becoming more and more serious between merchants and consumers.Merchants take advantage of information symmetry between the two sides to achieve the goal of winning in the competition by fraudulent and speculative behaviors such as false and false prices.In addition,the current B2C E-commerce platform has not established an effective supervision mechanism for the bad behaviors of merchants.Based on the complete information tripartite static game model,through the behavior analysis among the government,E-commerce platform and business in the B2C E-commerce platform supervision,it is found that the key to restrain collusion is to strengthen the observation and punishment of collusion.Therefore,according to the theory and method of system engineering,puts forward some improvement suggestions for the loopholes of the existing E-commerce platform supervision system,so as to create a safe and healthy online shopping environment.

关 键 词：B2C电商平台 三方博弈 制度工程学 监管制度 

分 类 号：F713.36[经济管理—产业经济]