上市公司业绩对赌行为分析——以斯太尔为例  

Analysis of the Value Adjustment Mechanism of the Performance of Listed Companies--Taking Steyr as an Example

作　　者：林永坚[1] 李欣怡[1] LIN Yongjian;LI Xinyi(School of Economics and Management,Xiamen University of Technology Xiamen,Fujian 361024)

机构地区：[1]厦门理工学院经济与管理学院,福建厦门361024

出　　处：《中国商论》2022年第10期95-98,共4页China Journal of Commerce

基　　金：福建省社会科学规划项目“福建企业定向增发中的业绩对赌行为的影响因素与市场反应研究”(FJ2018B066);厦门理工学院科研攀登计划项目“银行贷款的监督效应对股价崩盘风险的影响研究”(XPDST19001)。

摘　　要：本文以著名的斯太尔业绩对赌案例为研究对象。首先,对该起业绩对赌案例各参与方的角色及该起并购对赌案例的背景、过程进行介绍。其次,分别从该起并购案例最终对赌失败的原因、各并购参与方的成败角色及英达钢构进行业绩承诺的原因三个方面进行分析。在此基础上,本文提出观点:英达钢构代替标的资产出售方硅谷天堂进行业绩承诺是本起对赌案例最终失败的重要原因,同时对英达钢构与硅谷天堂是否存在内幕交易提出合理怀疑。最后,本文提出完善我国上市公司业绩对赌行为的相关对策建议。This article takes the well-known case of the value adjustment mechanism(VAM)of Steyr as the research object.First,it gives the overview of the role of all participants of the VAM of the corporate performance and the background and procedures of the VAM of mergers and acquisitions(M&A).Second,it analyzes from three aspects,including the reasons why the VAM fi nally failed,the role of all participants and the reasons why Yingda Steel Structure made commitments for its performance.On this basis,this research comes to the conclusion that Yingda Steel Structure,instead of the designated asset seller Heaven-sent Capital Management Group,made commitments,which is the important reason why the VAM fi nally failed,and that it raises reasonable doubts about the existence of insider trading in Yingda Steel structure and Heaven-sent Capital Management Group.Finally,this article puts forward relevant suggestions and countermeasures for improving the VAM of the performance of listed companies in China.

关 键 词：业绩对赌 对赌协议 斯太尔 英达钢构 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]