非执行董事与上市公司内幕交易——来自中国A股市场的经验证据  

Non-executive Directors and Insider Trading in Listed Companies:Evidences from China’s A-share Market

作　　者：陆超[1] 张斯毓 LU Chao;ZHANG Si-yu

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2022年第5期72-83,119,共13页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“基于公司特质信息的中国资本市场定价效率影响因素研究”(项目编号:19FJYB024)。

摘　　要：内幕交易严重损害了资本市场的“公开、公正、公平”原则,备受各界关注。本文以2009—2018年中国A股上市公司的重大资产重组事件为样本,采用固定效应模型实证检验了非执行董事对上市公司内幕交易行为的影响。研究结果表明,非执行董事能够显著降低上市公司内幕交易的发生;其次,不论是控股股东还是非控股股东委派的非执行董事都可以有效抑制上市公司的内幕交易行为;进一步研究发现,高管激励机制和外部监督机制对非执行董事抑制内幕交易的作用存在调节效应,二者均会削弱非执行董事与内幕交易之间的负向关系。本文的研究丰富了董事会治理作用和内幕交易的现有研究,为中国上市公司完善董事会治理结构提供了新的实践思路。Insider trading has seriously damaged the principle of“Open,Fair and Equitable”in the capital market,and has attracted attention from all walks of life.This paper empirically examines the effect of non-executive directors on insider trading behavior of listed companies using the fixed effects model with a sample of major asset restructuring events in Chinese A-shares from 2009 to 2018.The results show that non-executive directors can significantly reduce the occurrence of insider trading in listed companies;secondly,both non-executive directors appointed by controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders can effectively inhibit the insider trading behavior of listed companies;further research shows that executive incentive mechanism and external supervision mechanism have a moderating effect on the role of non-executive directors in inhibiting insider trading.Both of them will weaken the negative relationship between non-executive directors and insider trading.This paper enriches the existing research on the role of board governance and insider trading,and provides new practical ideas for the improvement of board governance structure of Chinese listed companies.

关 键 词：非执行董事 内幕交易 高管激励机制 外部监督机制 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学] F271