“地摊经济”下考虑资金约束与市场竞争的优化治理研究  

Research on the Optimal Governance Strategy with Capital Constraint and Market Competition under “Stall Economy”

作　　者：沈滨[1] 曹逸帆 董慈蔚 SHEN Bin;CAO Yifan;DONG Ciwei(Donghua University,Shanghai,China;Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan,China)

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院 [2]中南财经政法大学工商管理学院,武汉市430073

出　　处：《管理学报》2022年第5期749-757,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71871051,71971215);国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(71832001)。

摘　　要：作为“稳经济、保就业”的重要措施之一,“地摊经济”的发展亟需政府规范管理、积极引导。通过古诺模型刻画具有资金限制的数量庞大的摊主销售同质化产品的市场环境,探讨不同政府治理模式下摊主运营决策及面临不同治理目标时最优治理模式选择。研究表明:(1)若政府目标为最大化摊贩总利润或最大化社会福利,最优模式仅取决于管理费用高低;(2)若政府目标为最大化市场总销量,摊贩资金限制为政策制定主要考虑因素;(3)若政府目标为最大化消费者福利,政府最优决策不仅取决于摊位管理费用,还取决于摊贩资金限制。“Stall economy” is one of the important approaches to stabilize the economy and ensure employment. The government’s guidance is crucial for the development and encouragement of “stall economy”. The Cournot model is used to capture the characteristics of the market environment in which many vendors with capital constraints sell homogenized products, and the operational decisions of vendors under different governmental governance modes and the choice of optimal governance modes when facing different governance goals are discussed in this study. The results show that:(1) if the government aims at maximizing the total profit of all street vendors or maximizing social welfare, the level of administrative cost is a crucial factor to influence the governance strategy;(2) if the government aims at maximizing the total sales volume of the market, the capital restriction of street vendors becomes the main consideration factor in mode selection;(3) if the government aims at maximizing consumer welfare, the mode selection depends not only on the administrative cost but also on the capital constraint of the street vendor.

关 键 词：地摊经济 古诺竞争 资金约束 运营管理 政府治理 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]