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作 者:李庆华[1] 郭飞[2] 刘坤鹏[1] 裘丽娅[1] LI Qinghua;GUO Fei;LIU Kunpeng;QIU Liya(Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu,Anhui,China;Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan,China)
机构地区:[1]安徽财经大学会计学院 [2]中南财经政法大学会计学院,武汉市430073
出 处:《管理学报》2022年第5期768-777,共10页Chinese Journal of Management
基 金:国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BJY029);安徽省高校人文社会科学研究资助项目(SK2019A0471;SK2020A0026)。
摘 要:以2010~2019年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究CEO心理异质性对上市公司衍生工具使用决策的影响。研究发现,当CEO具有高风险承担意愿或极端的赌博式投机心理时,上市公司均更可能使用衍生工具。进一步研究表明:具备衍生工具专业才能的其他高管,更可能支持高风险承担意愿的CEO(不支持赌博式投机心理的CEO)使用衍生工具;CEO风险承担意愿越高,上市公司越不可能满足《企业会计准则第24号》对套期保值有效的要求,而更可能是选择性对冲;使用衍生工具的公司因CEO心理异质性会导致技术创新的异质性。Using the samples of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2010 to 2019, this study explored the impact of Chief Executive Officer(CEO) psychological heterogeneity on derivatives use in listed companies. The study found that listed companies were more likely to use derivatives when CEOs had high risk-taking willingness or extreme gambling speculative psychology. Further research revealed that non-CEO executives with expertise in derivatives were more likely to support the use of derivatives by CEOs who were willing to take risks(and not by CEOs who were willing to gamble). Second, the higher CEO’s risk-taking willingness, the less likely it was for listed companies to meet the hedging requirements of China Accounting Standards for Enterprises No.24(CAS24), but more likely for selective hedging. Finally, companies using derivatives were more likely to have heterogeneity of technological innovation because of CEO psychological heterogeneity.
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