基于Stackelberg模型的大国国际货币主导权博弈分析  

A Power Game Analysis of the Dominant Right of International Currency based on Stackelberg Model

作　　者：张应华[1] 洪勇 陈建付 ZHANG Ying-hua;HONG Yong;CHEN Jian-fu(Jiujiang University,Jiujiang Jiangxi 332005,China)

机构地区：[1]九江学院江西开放型经济研究中心,江西九江332005

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2022年第5期72-77,共6页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(18BGL011);江西省教育厅科学技术研究项目(GJJ211827)。

摘　　要：国际货币主导权历来是大国间竞争与博弈的焦点,在当今世界百年变局之际的中美博弈尤显激烈。文章以守成大国与崛起大国为研究对象,构建大国国际货币主导权竞争的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析博弈双方的策略组合与均衡,并进行数值仿真。结果表明,打压或竞争策略乃是博弈双方的占优策略,属于典型的囚徒困境博弈;要破解守成大国与崛起大国国际货币主导权博弈的囚徒困境,需要扩大合作收益,建立奖惩机制,增强合作动力。因此,对于中美国际货币主导权博弈的这一长期进程,建议通过构建全球金融利益共同体,建立合作机制,破解博弈困境。The dominance right of international currency has always been the focus of competition and game among major countries.At the time of the century change of the world,the game between China and the United States is particularly fierce.This paper constructs a Stackelberg master-slave game model of international currency dominance game of major countries,analyzes the strategy combination and equilibrium solution of both sides of the game,and carries out numerical simulation.The results show that the suppression or competition strategy is the dominant strategy of both sides of the game,which belongs to a typical prisoner's dilemma game.In order to solve the prisoner's dilemma of the game of international monetary dominance between conservative and rising powers,we need to expand the benefits of cooperation,establish a reward and punishment mechanism and enhance the power of cooperation.Therefore,for the long-term process of the game of international monetary dominance between China and the United States,it is suggested to solve the prisoner's dilemma by building a global financial interest community and establishing a cooperation mechanism.

关 键 词：STACKELBERG模型 中美博弈 囚徒困境 货币霸权 

分 类 号：F11[经济管理—国际贸易]