政府审计、贫困县官员政绩压力与债务风险  

Government Audit,Poverty County Officials Performance Pressure and Debt Risk

作　　者：王善平[1] 周钰 WANG Shanping;ZHOU Yu(Business School,Hunan Normal University,Changsha,Hunan 410081,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南师范大学商学院,湖南长沙410081

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2022年第3期113-119,共7页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(18AJY003);国家社会科学基金社团重点项目(20STA058)。

摘　　要：以经济人假设、政府审计是治理政府官员代理问题的免疫系统为理论基础,利用2015-2018年H省贫困县政府债务数据,实证检验政府审计抑制贫困县官员政绩压力对债务风险的影响。研究发现:官员政绩压力与贫困县债务风险显著正相关,政府审计的揭示、预防功能对抑制贫困县官员政绩压力影响债务风险的作用显著,而其抵御功能不显著。鉴于此,应构建和运用政府债务“数智审计”、系统改进官员绩效考核制度和科学合理地利用债务资金的杠杆作用,以助力实施“巩固拓展脱贫攻坚成果同乡村振兴有效衔接”战略。Based on the economic man hypothesis that government audit is the immune system to govern the agency problem of government officials,this paper empirically examines the impact of government audit on debt risk by using the government debt data of poor counties in H province from 2015 to 2018.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between official performance pressure and debt risk in poor counties.The disclosure and prevention function of government audit plays a significant role in restraining the impact of official performance pressure on debt risk in poor counties,but its defense function is not significant.In view of this,it is necessary to construct and apply"numerical intelligence audit"of government debt,systematically improve the performance appraisal system of officials,and make scientific and reasonable use of the leverage of debt funds to facilitate the implementation of the strategy of"consolidating and expanding the achievements of poverty alleviation and effectively linking rural revitalization".

关 键 词：政府债务风险 官员政绩压力 政府审计 

分 类 号：F239.44[经济管理—会计学]