从事与物的区别来看边沁和密尔的快乐主义  

On Bentham and Mill’s Hedonism from the View of the Difference between Event and Thing

作　　者：张家海 Zhang Jiahai(School of Philosophy,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《晋阳学刊》2022年第3期84-91,共8页Academic Journal of Jinyang

摘　　要：当边沁和密尔宣称快乐是行为最终的动机和目的时,快乐就被看成了与引起快乐的活动截然分离的抽象之物,这时就必须把快乐理解为包含“先验经验”的物,而非事。密尔对快乐做出质的区分后依然面临这个问题,这显然是荒谬的,问题根本在于他们忽略并颠倒了事与物的关系。快乐与引起快乐的事情是有机的整体,不是快乐有高低之分,而是引起快乐的事情存在差异。密尔所说的高级快乐的性质与边沁提出的行为和事情的衍生性是内在相关的,而人的历史的连续性就源于衍生性,具有衍生性的活动构成人的历史,不具有衍生性的活动是非历史的。When Bentham and Mill asserted that pleasure is the fundamental motive and ultimate end of action,pleasure has been regarded as an abstract thing which can distinct from the activity that causes it,then we have to think the pleasure as something that involves transcendental experiences,not a thing.The fundamental problem of Bentham and Mill is that they ignored and reversed the relationship between the event and the thing which is obviously ridiculous.Pleasure and the activity that causes it is an organic whole.It’s not that pleasure has something high or low in quality,but the activity that causes it have different nature.What Mill called the quality of higher pleasure is actually what Bentham called the fecundity of action and event,the fecundity is the continuity of human activities.The fecundity as the historicity is expressed in the human activities,the fecund activities constitute the history of man;non-fecund activities are non-historical.

关 键 词：边沁 密尔 快乐主义 事与物 衍生性 

分 类 号：D601[政治法律—政治学]