美国存款保险早期纠正与银行监管权问题探析  

Research on Prompt Correction of American Deposit Insurance and Bank Supervision Power

作　　者：王立章[1] WANG Lizhang

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行济南分行,山东济南250000

出　　处：《吉林金融研究》2022年第2期8-12,共5页Journal of Jilin Financial Research

摘　　要：早期纠正是存款保险制度实现“风险最小化”目标的重要手段,而监管权又是实现早期纠正效果的基础保障。本文通过论述我国存款保险早期纠正以及银行监管权的现状、关系以及存在的问题,借鉴美国经验,得到“监管权为早期纠正权底色”这一结论,并由此建议从法律层面着手,明确存款保险机构的法律地位、监管重心与边界,明确早期纠正职能并探索中国特色早期纠正措施,赋予相应的监管权以保障早期纠正严肃性,构建“非纠正即接管”的处置触发机制并进一步优化金融监管布局,确保存款保险及早期纠正的定位和目标的实现。Prompt correction is an important means for the deposit insurance system to achieve the goal of"risk minimization",and the supervision power is the basic guarantee to achieve the effect of prompt correction.By discussing the current situation,relationship and existing problems of China's deposit insurance prompt correction and bank supervision power,and drawing on the experience of the United States,this paper obtains the conclusion that"supervision power is the background of prompt correction power",and suggests to clarify the legal status,supervision focus and boundary of deposit insurance institutions from the legal level,clarify the prompt correction function and explore prompt correction measures with Chinese characteristics,endow corresponding regulatory power to ensure the seriousness of prompt correction,build a disposal trigger mechanism of"take over if not corrected",further optimize the layout of financial supervision,and ensure the positioning and objectives of deposit insurance and prompt correction.

关 键 词：存款保险制度 早期纠正 监管权 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]