风险规避、博弈能力与佃农土地合约选择--来自20世纪30年代卜凯农家调查的证据  

A Study On the Choice of Tenant Land Contract about Risk Aversion,Game Power:Base on Buck's Original Household Data in 1930s

作　　者：陈苏 胡浩[2] 张利国 Chen Su;Hu Hao;Zhang Liguo(School of Economics,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,China;College of Economics and Management,Nanjing Agricultural University,Nanjing 210095,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学经济学院,330013 [2]南京农业大学经济管理学院,210095

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2022年第3期41-60,共20页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：国家社会科学重大项目“农村集体产权制度改革深化与经济发展研究”(20ZDA045);国家自然科学基金地区项目“南方多熟制粮区小农户化肥减量化行为及干预效果的实证研究”(72063014);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目“南方多熟制粮区化肥减量化政策效果与农户响应研究”(20YJC790014)的资助。

摘　　要：中国的经验证据表明,分成合约和定额合约已经共存相当长的历史,也是最有争议的土地租佃制度。风险规避是影响土地合约选择的重要因素,而风险规避与合约当事人的博弈能力存在较强的相关性。本文假定在土地同质的条件下,将风险规避、博弈能力与土地合约选择纳入统一框架进行了理论分析,利用20世纪30年代卜凯农家调查资料整理获得的小麦产区5省12县1190个农户数据进行了实证检验。结果显示:在土地同质的条件下,佃农风险规避程度越高,选择分成合约的可能性就越高。佃农博弈能力越强,选择分成合约的可能性也就越高,但较低的博弈能力会弱化风险规避程度与分成合约之间的正向效应,选择定额合约的可能性增加。本研究为合约共存现象提供了一种新的解释。China's empirical evidence showed that sharing contract and fixed contract had coexisted for a long time,and it is also the most controversial land tenurial system.Risk aversion plays an important factor in affecting the choice of land contract,and there is a strong correlation between risk aversion and contract parties'game ability.In this paper,assuming that under the condition of homogeneous land,risk aversion,game ability and land contract selection will be included in the unified framework for theoretical analysis.Then making an empirical test on the data of 1190 farmers in 5 provinces and 12 counties in the wheat producing area.The results show that under the condition of homogeneous land,the higher the risk aversion degree of tenant,the higher the possibility of choosing sharing contract.The stronger the game ability of tenant,the higher the possibility of choosing sharing contract,but the lower the game ability will weaken the positive effect between risk aversion and sharing contract,and the possibility of choosing fixed contract will increase.This paper provides a new explanation for the phenomenon of contract coexistence.

关 键 词：风险规避 博弈地租率 土地合约 卜凯农家数据 

分 类 号：F321.1[经济管理—产业经济]