去杠杆政策、债权人治理与公司运营效率--基于准自然实验的经验证据  

Deleveraging Policy,Creditor Governance,and Corporate Operational Efficiency:Empirical Evidence Based on Quasi Natural Experiment

作　　者：秦海林[1] 戚建爽 QIN Hailin;QI Jianshuang(School of Economics and Management,Tiangong University,Tianjin 300387,China)

机构地区：[1]天津工业大学经济管理学院,天津300387

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2022年第6期105-118,共14页East China Economic Management

基　　金：天津市社会科学规划项目“缓解中小企业融资难的信贷担保制度创新研究”(TJYY13-019)“僵尸企业的高杠杆率是否会引爆金融风险?”(TJYY17-010)。

摘　　要：去杠杆政策虽然在降低公司财务风险方面发挥了积极作用,但也会弱化公司债权人治理,拉升公司第一类代理成本,从而导致公司运营管理效率低下。文章以我国2014—2018年A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,运用双重差分模型,探究了去杠杆政策的实施对企业运营效率的影响。研究结果表明:去杠杆政策的实施显著地降低了企业的运营效率,且第一类代理成本与自由现金流量在这一过程中发挥了部分中介作用;去杠杆政策对企业运营效率的降低效果在中小规模企业、股权集中度高的企业、拥有低质量外部审计机构的企业样本中尤为显著。因此,在去杠杆政策的深入推进中,应充分关注企业日常经营运转状况,采取相应措施防止因债权人治理弱化引致的运营效率低下。Although the deleveraging policy has played a positive role in reducing the company's financial risk,it will also weaken the corporate creditor governance and raise the first kind of agency cost of the company,resulting in the low effi⁃ciency of the company's operation and management.Taking China's A-share non-financial listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as the research sample,this paper uses the DID model to explore the impact of the implementation of deleveraging policy on enterprise operation efficiency.The results show that the implementation of deleveraging policy significantly re⁃duces the operation efficiency of enterprises,and the first kind of agency cost and free cash flow play a partial mediating role in this process;the effect of deleveraging policy on the reduction of enterprise operation efficiency is particularly sig⁃nificant in the samples of small and medium-sized enterprises,enterprises with high equity concentration and enterprises with low-quality external audit institutions.Therefore,in the further promotion of the deleveraging policy,we should pay full attention to the daily operation of enterprises and take corresponding measures to prevent the low operation efficiency caused by the weakening of creditor governance.

关 键 词：去杠杆政策 债权人治理 企业运营效率 双重差分模型 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学] F275