央行言辞沟通、分析师预测与宏观信息含量  

The Central Bank’s Verbal Communication,Analyst Forecasts and Macro Information Content

作　　者：平川 PING Chuan(Shandong Yajun Economic Research Institute,Qingdao,Shandong,266100)

机构地区：[1]山东亚隽经济研究院,山东青岛266100

出　　处：《西部金融》2022年第3期7-16,共10页West China Finance

摘　　要：本文以金融分析师为研究对象,考察了央行言辞沟通的微观传播机制。研究发现,央行言辞沟通显著提升了分析师预测的宏观信息含量,言辞沟通对分析师宏观信息含量具有非对称性影响,当货币政策处于紧缩时或者市场处于熊市时,言辞沟通的影响更加显著。经济后果的检验表明央行言辞沟通能够通过促进分析师预测的宏观信息使用,进一步提升分析师预测的准确度。本文研究对理解央行言辞沟通的微观作用机制具有重要意义,也深化和丰富了对分析师预测行为理解的研究。This paper takes financial analysts as the research object and examines the micro communication mechanism of the central bank’s verbal communication.The study found that the central bank’s verbal communication significantly increased the macro-information content of analysts’forecasts,and that verbal communication has an asymmetric impact on the analyst’s macro-information content.When monetary policy is tightening or the market is in a bear market,the impact of verbal communication is even more significant.The test of economic consequences shows that the central bank’s verbal communication can further improve the accuracy of analysts’forecasts by promoting the use of macroinformation forecasts by analysts.The research in this paper is of great significance for understanding the micro-mechanism of central bank verbal communication,and it also deepens and enriches the research on the understanding of analysts’forecast behavior.

关 键 词：中央银行 货币政策 分析师预测 宏观信息 

分 类 号：F830.31[经济管理—金融学]