精准扶贫中上市公司与投资者的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary game analysis of listed companies and investors in precise poverty alleviation

作　　者：齐岳[1,2,3] 张雨 QI Yue;ZHANG Yu(Business School,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China;China Academy of Corporate Governance,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China;Socialism with Chinese Characteristics Research Center,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [2]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071 [3]中国特色社会主义经济建设协同创新中心,天津300071

出　　处：《未来与发展》2022年第5期71-82,共12页Future and Development

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“金融创新背景下多目标公司治理投资支持实体经济研究”(批准号:18BGL063)。

摘　　要：国家鼓励上市公司参与精准扶贫,履行社会责任。上市公司积极参与精准扶贫的公告能够起到向社会公众传递信号的作用,同时也为企业带来了良好的声誉。投资者对上市公司精准扶贫信息如何处理,是否会因为上市公司积极参与精准扶贫的良好声誉而购买股票;上市公司是否会因为市场的反应调整改变扶贫的积极性值得思考。以投资者和上市公司作为博弈主体,首次将上市公司精准扶贫策略集合与资本市场的交易行为发生关联,运用演化博弈模型,创新性地探讨在投资者和上市公司的交互作用下,投资者和上市公司行为策略选择的作用机理和演化过程,并通过数值模拟和仿真,分析不同情形下上市公司精准扶贫体系的效率和演化路径。结果发现:博弈双方存在多重演化稳定策略,并对应不同的演化稳定条件;当积极扶贫成本小于消极扶贫的惩罚时,上市公司以更快的速度达到均衡;当声誉效益大于羊群效应带来的损失时,投资者以更快的速度达到均衡。通过数值模拟和仿真分析得出结论:投资者购买股票通过声誉效应影响上市公司精准扶贫的积极性;降低上市公司扶贫所付出的成本有利于提升其精准扶贫的积极性;加大监管部门对消极扶贫的惩罚力度,能够形成约束机制,促进上市公司积极扶贫。The state encourages listed companies to participate in targeted poverty alleviation and fulfill their social responsibilities. The announcement of the active participation of listed companies in targeted poverty alleviation can serve as a signal to the public and also bring a good reputation to the company. How should investors deal with the information of targeted poverty alleviation by listed companies? Will it be because listed companies actively participate in the good reputation of targeted poverty alleviation? Will listed companies change their enthusiasm for poverty alleviation because of market adjustments? For the first time, the listed companies’ precise poverty alleviation strategies are related to the trading behavior of the capital market. The evolutionary game model is used to innovatively explore the interaction between investors and listed companies. The action mechanism and evolution process of listed company’s behavior strategy selection, and through numerical simulation and simulation, analyze the efficiency and evolution path of the listed company’s precise poverty alleviation system in different situations. The results show that there are multiple evolutionary stabilization strategies on both sides of the game, and corresponding to different evolutionary stability conditions;when the cost of active poverty alleviation is less than the punishment of passive poverty alleviation, the listed companies reach equilibrium at a faster rate;when the reputation benefit is greater than the herding effect When losing, investors reach equilibrium at a faster rate. Through numerical simulation and simulation analysis, it is concluded that investors’ purchase of stocks affects the enthusiasm of targeted poverty alleviation of listed companies through reputation effects;reducing the cost of listed companies’ poverty alleviation is conducive to enhancing their enthusiasm for targeted poverty alleviation;The punishment intensity can form a restraint mechanism and promote listed companies to actively

关 键 词：精准扶贫 演化博弈模型 扶贫成本 数值模拟 

分 类 号：F812.4[经济管理—财政学]