基于博弈视角的政府引导基金三方契约研究  

Study of Tripartite Contract of Government Guide Fund Based on Game Theory

作　　者：王斌 WANG Bin(School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100039)

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学经济与管理学院,北京100039

出　　处：《科技促进发展》2021年第12期2113-2120,共8页Science & Technology for Development

摘　　要：政府引导基金运作中存在复杂的委托代理关系,在信息不对称下很容易引发道德风险,并导致引导基金的投资运作偏离政策性目标。本研究基于博弈论视角构建了一个同时考虑双重委托代理关系的激励监督模型,对引导基金、受托管理机构和子基金管理人的三方博弈进行了分析。研究发现:(1)基金管理人的努力行为选择受到引导基金激励和受托管理机构监督的共同影响,提高激励水平或加强监管力度可减少违规投资行为的发生;(2)为了让受托管理机构履行监督职能,必须对其进行激励,对受托管理机构实行激励工资制优于固定工资制;(3)在制定针对某个代理人的最优激励水平时,引导基金需同时考虑与两个代理人有关的参数对激励效果的影响。Considered that there is a complex principal-agent relationship in the operation of Government Guide Fund,which can lead to moral hazard in the case of asymmetric information and the deviation of the investment operation from the policy objective of Guide Fund.Thus an incentive-supervision mechanism model considering dual principal-agent relationship was constructed,and the tripartite game between the Guide Fund,entrusted agency and sub fund were analyzed.The results show that:(1)The choice of effort behavior of fund manager is affected by the incentive from Guide Fund and the supervision from the entrusted agency at the same time.Improving the incentive level or strengthening the supervision can reduce the occurrence of illegal investment.(2)The incentive salary system is better than the fixed salary system to make entrusted agency perform its supervision function normally.(3)Guide Fund should consider the influence of the parameters related to two agents on the incentive effect when formulating the optimal incentive level for one of the agents.

关 键 词：政府引导基金 创业投资基金 双重委托代理 三方博弈 激励监督机制 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F224.32