股权激励、契约异质性与实体企业金融化  

Equity Incentive,Contract Heterogeneity,and the Financialization of Entity Enterprises

作　　者：刘翰林[1] 郑鑫波 LIU Hanlin;ZHENG Xinbo(School of Accounting,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou 310000,China)

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学会计学院,浙江杭州310000

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2022年第3期82-92,共11页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71602178)。

摘　　要：从股权激励视角切入,利用2008—2019年沪深A股上市公司的经验数据,探究股权激励对企业金融化的影响。研究发现:从整体上看,股权激励会抑制企业金融化。基于微观契约层面,股权激励强度越大,股权激励对企业金融化的抑制程度越大;相较于限制性股票,股票期权对企业金融化的抑制程度更大;只有激励期限较长的股权激励才会抑制企业金融化。作用机制检验表明,股权激励会降低股东与管理层之间的代理成本、缓解融资约束进而抑制企业金融化。研究结论有助于充实和深化股权激励与企业金融化关系研究,也为从公司内部治理层面防范和化解实体经济风险提供证据支持。From the perspective of equity incentive,this paper uses the empirical data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2019 to explore the influence of equity incentive on enterprise financialization.The study finds that equity incentive will inhibit the financialization of enterprises on the whole.Based on the micro contract level,the greater the intensity of equity incentive,the greater the inhibition of equity incentive on enterprise financialization;Compared with restricted stock,stock option has a greater inhibition on enterprise financialization;Only the equity incentive with a long incentive period can inhibit enterprise financialization.The test of action mechanism shows that equity incentive will reduce the agency cost between shareholders and management,alleviate financing constraints,and then inhibit enterprise financialization.The research conclusion is helpful to enrich and deepen the research on the relationship between equity incentive and enterprise financialization,and also provides evidence for preventing and resolving real economic risks from the level of corporate internal governance.

关 键 词：股权激励 企业金融化 契约条款设置 代理成本 融资约束 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]