交易所年报问询函如何影响审计收费?——基于风险揭示效应和风险传导效应的检验  被引量:15

How Do the Exchange Comment Letters Affect Audit Fees? Risk Disclosure and Risk Conduction Effects

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作  者:李胜楠[1] 娄艺琳 王宇婷 LI Shengnan;LOU Yilin;WANG Yuting(Department of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China)

机构地区:[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出  处:《审计与经济研究》2022年第3期52-61,共10页Journal of Audit & Economics

基  金:国家社会科学基金项目(21BGL113);山东省自然科学基金面上项目(ZR2020MG047)。

摘  要:作为新兴一线监管方式,交易所问询函能否发挥证券交易所“风险预警”的职能要求?以2015—2019年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从审计风险视角出发,探究交易所年报问询函对审计收费的影响机制。研究结果显示,收到年报问询函的公司有更高的审计收费。高质量的内部控制和高媒体关注度削弱了问询函对审计收费的影响,表明“风险揭示效应”的存在;同时,收到年报问询函的公司有更大的概率进行财务重述、卷入诉讼案件和受到行政处罚,进而提高了审计收费,表明“风险传导效应”的存在。结论从审计视角肯定了交易所年报问询函的风险预警作用,对于推动证券市场监管模式创新具有一定的启示意义。As an emerging first-line supervision method,whether the exchange comment letter can perform the function of“risk warning”has been attracting much attention from the field proper.In this paper,we select Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2019 as research samples,explore the impact mechanism of the exchange comment letters on audit fees from the perspective of audit risks.The result shows that the comment letters will increase audit fees.High-quality internal controls and high media attention have weakened the impact of comment letters on audit fees,indicating the existence of a“risk disclosure effect”.At the same time,companies that have received comment letters have a greater probability of financial restatements,being involved in litigation cases,and being subject to administrative penalties,thereby increasing audit fees,indicating the existence of a“risk conduction effect”.This paper,from the audit perspective,confirms the role of the comment letters as a risk warning,inspiring to drive an innovation of China s securities market supervision model.

关 键 词:交易所年报问询函 审计风险 审计收费 风险揭示 风险传导 审计质量 公司治理 

分 类 号:F239.43[经济管理—会计学]

 

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