政府约束激励政策下供应链低碳转型的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Low Carbon Transformation of Supply Chain Under Government Constraint and Incentive Policy

作　　者：黄蕾 董雨 Huang Lei;Dong Yu(School of Economics and Management,Anhui University of Science and Technology,Huainan,Anhui 232001,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽理工大学经济与管理学院,安徽淮南232001

出　　处：《黑龙江工业学院学报（综合版）》2022年第4期115-121,共7页Journal of Heilongjiang University of Technology(Comprehensive Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“创新驱动下能源行业结构转型的效率评价、策略博弈及发展模式研究”(项目编号:71973001);安徽理工大学创新基金项目“数字经济时代反垄断治理的博弈分析”(项目编号:2021CX2137)。

摘　　要：基于新冠疫情及国家“双碳”目标的背景,在引入政府约束激励机制下,首先对供应链系统中的制造业与物流企业的协同低碳转型进行演化博弈研究,其次对稳定策略进行复制动态方程分析,最后运用Matlab软件对方程进行数值仿真以验证分析结果。研究表明:政府约束激励机制可以影响供应链企业的低碳转型,且若想达到最优演化策略应将其控制在合理范围内,该范围与上下游企业的低碳转型成本、转型后的收益以及“搭便车”收益有关,同时与转型成本以及“搭便车”收益成负相关性。Based on the background of COVID-19 and the"dual carbon"target set by the nation,under the introduction of the government constraint and incentive mechanism,the evolutionary game of collaborative low-carbon transformation of manufacturing and logistics enterprises in the supply chain system is studied.At the same time,the replication dynamic equation analysis is carried out on the stability strategy.Finally,the Matlab software is used to carry out numerical simulation of the equation to verify the analysis results.The research shows that the government constraint and incentive mechanism can affect the low-carbon transformation of supply chain enterprises;In order to achieve the optimal evolution strategy,it should be controlled within a reasonable range,which is related to the low-carbon transformation cost,post transformation income and"free rider"income of upstream and downstream enterprises,and has a negative correlation with the transformation cost and"free rider"income.

关 键 词：供应链 低碳转型 约束激励机制 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F274