A model of optimising political expenditures to buy government power  

作　　者：Austin Murphy 

机构地区：[1]Department of Accounting and Finance,School of Business Administration,Oakland University,Rochester,MI,USA

出　　处：《Economic and Political Studies》2019年第4期433-453,共21页经济与政治研究（英文版）

摘　　要：This research develops a model of optimal political expenditures and shows how money inevitably controls government leaders,subject only to a single constraint relating to negative public reaction.The paper demonstrates theoretically why many businesses do not make such investments despite abnormally high returns from the expended political capital.In particular,firms with less economic resources optimally recognise that they can successfully participate in the political process only in consortium with the dominant players of mutual interests to influence broader government policies.The largest corporations are therefore able to buy government power with a minimal political outlay.

关 键 词：LOBBYING campaign contributions special interests political capital elections INVESTMENTS 

分 类 号：D81[政治法律—国际关系]