“双碳”目标下煤炭绿色物流政企行为策略演化博弈研究——基于系统动力学视角  

Evoluti onary game study on government and enterprise behavior strategy of coal green logistics under “double-carbon” goal: A study based on the system dynamics perspective

作　　者：张欣乐 张毅[1] 石晓敏 Zhang Xinle;Zhang Yi;Shi Xiaomin(School of Economics and Management,Taiyuan University of Technology,Jinzhong 030600,China)

机构地区：[1]太原理工大学经济管理学院,山西晋中030600

出　　处：《煤炭经济研究》2022年第1期30-38,共9页Coal Economic Research

基　　金：山西省哲学社会科学规划课题(20190292);上海市逆向物流与供应链协同创新中心(培育)开放课题(A30DB212103-06)。

摘　　要：“双碳”目标下煤炭物流绿色化问题亟待解决。在有限理性的视角下,分析政府、企业双方在煤炭绿色物流中的角色和利益关系,构建煤炭绿色物流政企行为策略演化博弈模型,运用系统动力学分析影响双方主体演化趋势以及结果的因素。结果表明:双方初始策略占比越接近均衡状态,系统越快收敛到均衡状态。在煤炭绿色物流中,煤炭企业行为决策的主要影响因素为:绿色技术成本、额外社会收益、政府补贴成本。政府补贴成本与煤炭企业的行为决策演化结果呈现倒U型关系。政府行为决策的主要影响因素为:绿色技术成本、额外社会收益、政府补贴成本、政府不补贴协调成本、公信力下降。The greening of coal logistics under the “double carbon” goal needs to be solved urgently. From the perspective of bounded rationality, this paper analyzes the role and interest relationship between government and enterprises in coal green logistics. To construct an evolutionary game model of government-enterprise behavior strategy for coal green logistics. System dynamics is used to analyze the factors that affect the evolution trend and results of both parties. The results show that the closer the proportion of the two initial strategies is to the equilibrium state, the faster the system converges to equilibrium state. In coal green logistics, the main influencing factors of coal enterprise behavior decision are green technology cost, extra social income, government subsidy cost. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the government subsidy cost and the behavioral decision evolution of coal enterprises. The main influencing factors of government behavior decision are green technology cost, extra social income, government subsidy cost, government non-subsidy coordination cost, and public credibility decrease.

关 键 词：“双碳”目标 煤炭绿色物流 政企行为策略 演化博弈 系统动力学 

分 类 号：F416.21[经济管理—产业经济]