中国国有企业治理制度:现状、问题及对策  被引量:1

The Governance System of Chinese State-owned Enterprises:Present Situation,Problems and Countermeasures

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作  者:李俊 殷峻巍 Li Jun;Yin Junwei(Tongling Municipal Party School,Anhui 244000,P.R.China;Anhui Broadcasting and Television Station,Hefei 230066,P.R.China)

机构地区:[1]中共铜陵市委党校经济教研室,安徽铜陵244000 [2]安徽广播电视台总编室,安徽合肥230066

出  处:《江西科技师范大学学报》2022年第2期56-64,共9页Journal of Jiangxi Science & Technology Normal University

基  金:安徽省哲学社会科学规划一般项目“劳动力所有权视角下的国有企业治理制度研究”(编号:AHSKY2019D045)。

摘  要:中国国有企业改革的实质是生产关系的变革,这要求按照公有制属性把实现职工的生产资料所有权与劳动力所有权放在首位,采取相应的治理制度确保他们享有全面而充分的治理权力。实证分析表明,尽管国有企业在形式上建立了现代企业制度,但在“经营者激励”思想的指导下,政府不断放权让利于经营者,职工的劳动力所有权和生产资料所有权日渐式微,这是国有企业的主要矛盾,也是治理制度低效的根源。解决之道是摒弃“经营者激励”的改革思路,回归“劳动者治理”。the essence of China's state-owned enterprise reform is the reform of production relations,which requires that the ownership of production means and labor force of workers should be put in the first place according to the property of public ownership,and corresponding governance systems should be adopted to ensure that they enjoy comprehensive and sufficient governance power.The empirical analysis shows that,although the state-owned enterprises formally established the modern enterprise system,but under the guidance of"managers'motivation",the government continues to delegate power in favor of the operators,resulting in weakening ownership of workers,which is the main contradiction of state-owned enterprises,and also the root cause of inefficient governance systems.The solution is to abandon the reform idea of"operator incentive"and return to"labor management".

关 键 词:国有企业 治理制度 劳动力所有权 生产资料所有权 

分 类 号:F20[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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