必须摒弃归纳推理的形式规则吗?  

Must the Formal Rules of Inductive Reasoning be Discarded?

作　　者：梁贤华 LIANG Xianhua(School of Philosophy and Social Development,South China Normal University,Guangzhou,Guangdong,510631)

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学哲学与社会发展学院,广东广州510631

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2022年第4期30-36,共7页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“逻辑真理论的历史源流、理论前沿与应用研究”(项目编号:17ZDA025)。

摘　　要：绿蓝悖论是现代归纳逻辑研究的一个重大事件,它直接挑战了归纳的逻辑基础,迫使人们重新思考现代归纳逻辑的发展方向的问题。近年来,归纳逻辑的研究出现了两种截然不同的研究取向。而在某种意义上,它们都是对绿蓝悖论的最新回应。一方面,以诺顿为代表的实质归纳理论主张彻底摒弃归纳的形式化规则,认为应当把归纳推理研究的重心集中到经验事实中来。另一方面,一个鲜明的对比是,帕里斯所建构的纯粹归纳逻辑体系进一步发挥了卡尔纳普的形式归纳思想,明确地把归纳当作数理逻辑的一个分支来研究。这两种不同的归纳理论是否可以共存?The Grue paradox is a major event in the study of modern inductive logic.It directly challenges the logical foundation of induction and forces people to rethink the development direction of modern inductive logic.In recent years,two completely different research orientations have emerged in the study of inductive logic.In a sense,they are all the latest responses to the Grue paradox.On the one hand,the material induction theory represented by John Norton advocates to completely abandon the formal rules of induction,he believes that inductive reasoning study should be focused on empirical facts.On the other hand,as a contrast,the pure inductive logic system constructed by Jeffrey Paris further exerts Carnap’s thought of formal induction,and explicitly considers induction as a branch of mathematical logic to study.Can these two different induction theories coexist?

关 键 词：实质归纳理论 纯粹归纳逻辑 形式规则 绿蓝悖论 

分 类 号：N0[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]