考虑环保税与规制俘获的三方治理演化博弈模型及策略优化研究  

Research on Tripartite Governance Evolutionary Game Model and Environmental Governance Strategy Under Environment Tax and Regulation Capture

作　　者：范如国[1] 吴婷[1] 樊唯 FAN Ru-guo;WU Ting;FAN Wei(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《软科学》2022年第5期122-130,共9页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大招标课题(20&ZD155);教育部哲学社会科学研究后期项目(19JHQ091)。

摘　　要：引入规制俘获建立三方演化博弈模型,同时考虑地方政府偏好和环保税制度,来分析规制俘获形成的机理,并通过仿真来研究破解规制俘获和构建有效环境治理体系的主要措施和路径。结果表明:地方政府容易被大型企业俘获,而中央政府督查是避免规制俘获的关键因素;加大政府对企业的惩罚力度能增强企业治污的意愿,且地方政府的惩罚政策对督促企业治污更加直接有效;降低地方政府经济偏好的同时需要监督机制的保驾护航,地方政府才能完全达到严格执行环境政策的稳定状态。By introducing regulation capture to establish a tripartite evolutionary game, while considering the preferences of local governments and environmental protection tax, this paper analyzes the mechanism of regulation capture. And then, it introduces the numerical simulations to study the measures to prevent the regulation capture dilemma and builds an effective environmental governance system. Result shows that local governments are easily captured by large enterprises, and central government supervision is a key factor in avoiding regulation capture. Increasing government punishments on enterprises can increase the willingness of enterprises to control pollution, and local governments′ punishments are more direct and effective.While reducing the economic preference of the local government, it needs the protection of the supervision mechanism, so that the local government can fully achieve a stable state of strict implementation of environmental policies.

关 键 词：环保税 规制俘获 环境治理 演化博弈 仿真 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程]