基于文本信息的科技型中小企业信用风险识别信号博弈模型  

A Signaling Game Model of Credit Risk Recognition for Technological SMEs Based on Text Information

作　　者：张目 吕知远 ZHANG Mu;LV Zhi-yuan(School of Big Data Application and Economics,Guizhou University of Finance and Economics,Guiyang 550025;Guizhou Institution for Technology Innovation&Entrepreneurship Investment,Guizhou University of Finance and Economics,Guiyang 550025)

机构地区：[1]贵州财经大学大数据应用与经济学院,贵阳550025 [2]贵州财经大学贵州科技创新创业投资研究院,贵阳550025

出　　处：《软科学》2022年第5期131-136,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金地区项目(71861003)。

摘　　要：针对银行与科技型中小企业的信息不对称问题,运用信号博弈理论,以企业财务报表作为识别信用风险的信号构建基本模型,对分离均衡与混同均衡存在的条件进行分析;引入文本信息决策变量构建扩展模型,考察银行获取的文本信息水平对市场均衡的影响。结果表明,银行利用文本信息对企业进行信用核查,使得分离均衡更容易出现;在满足银行获取文本信息的成本约束条件下,当高风险企业付出的与文本信息水平相关的期望风险成本足够高时,引入文本信息决策可以有效遏制高风险企业的伪装行为。在大数据背景下,银行可以在企业财务报表的基础上引入文本信息决策,降低信息不对称,提高信用风险识别能力。Aiming at the problem of information asymmetry between banks and technological SMEs,this paper uses the signaling game theory to construct a basic model which takes the financial statements of enterprises as the signal to identify the credit risk.Using the basic model,it analyzes conditions of separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium.Introducing the text information decision-making variable into the basic model,it constructs an extended model to investigate the influence of the level of text information obtained by banks on market equilibrium.Results show that,the banks use text information to check the credit status of enterprises,which makes the separating equilibrium easier to occur.Under the cost constraint of obtaining text information for banks,when the expected risk cost related to the level of text informatio n paid by high-risk enterprises is high eno ugh,the introduction of text information decision-making can effectively curb the camouflage behavior of high-risk enterprises.Under the background of big data,based on the financial statements of enterprises,the banks can introduce the text information decision-making to reduce information asymmetry and improve the ability of credit risk recognition.

关 键 词：科技型中小企业 信用风险 信用风险识别 文本信息 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]