制度化环境要素与基层政府“绩效拐点”--来自安徽省部分乡镇的经验证据  被引量:1

Institutionalized environmental elements and grassroots government"performance turning points"--Evidence from some townships in Anhui Province

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作  者:邹琪[1] 樊丽 ZOU Qi;FAN Li(Institute of Finance and Public Management,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu 233030,China)

机构地区:[1]安徽财经大学财政与公共管理学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出  处:《山西农业大学学报(社会科学版)》2022年第3期42-54,共13页Journal of Shanxi Agricultural University:Social Science Edition

基  金:教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目“发展导向与乡镇政府绩效——基于安徽省部分乡镇政府的实证”(18YJA630158)。

摘  要:HalG.Rainey等基于西方发达国家政府提出的“绩效拐点”论对中国基层政府是否有解释力,目前还没有任何经验性的研究可以证明。试图探讨加强基层政府的工作自主权、自主财权、工作监督能否显著改善其绩效。利用对安徽省部分乡镇的问卷、访谈调查数据,从政府内部、外部两个方面的7个维度测量乡镇政府绩效,并运用ologit回归分析检验相关研究假设。结果表明:增加基层政府工作自主权和工作监督能显著改善其绩效,“绩效拐点”论并不存在;但增加基层政府自主财权并不能显著改善其绩效。赋予基层政府更多工作自主权、平衡地方经济发展与地方政府利益诉求,对于改善基层政府绩效具有更加重要的意义。There is no empirical research on whether Hal G.Rainey’s“performance turning point”theory,which is proposed in the context of western developed countries,has explanatory power for grassroots government in China..This study attempts to explore whether strengthening autonomy,independent financial power,and supervision of the grassroots government can significantly improve its performance.Using the questionnaire data of some towns in Anhui Province,government performance was evaluated from seven internal and external dimensions.The research hypothesis was experimented by using logit regression analysis.Results show that increasing the autonomy and supervision can significantly improve its performance with no“performance turning point”,but increasing the independent financial power does not significantly improve its performance.Giving the grassroots government autonomy,strengthening supervision,and properly controlling their financial power is important for improving their performance.

关 键 词:财政分权 工作监督 地方分权 乡村治理 政府绩效 

分 类 号:F327[经济管理—产业经济]

 

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