可转债与控制权私利下公司投资决策  

Convertible bond and firm investment decisions under private benefits of control

作　　者：宋丹丹[1] 杨运慧 唐小林 Song Dandan;Yang Yunhui;Tang Xiaolin(School of Finance and Statistics,Hunan University,Changsha 410079,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南大学金融与统计学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2022年第2期194-206,共13页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502054);湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(2016JJ3046,2020JJ4227);长沙市科技计划项目资助项目(kq2005004)。

摘　　要：探究可转债和控制权私利对公司投资决策和代理成本的影响.通过建立实物期权模型,基于均衡定价原理,分析计算了投资期权价值、最优投资策略以及控股股东的代理成本.研究结果表明,相比普通债,可转债能显著地提高控股股东的投资期权价值,但同时降低公司价值.控股股东倾向于利用可转债为公司融资,但从社会福利角度公司更倾向于利用普通债融资.同时,可转债不仅有效地抑制了控股股东的过度投资行为,而且显著地缓解了控股股东与中小投资者之间的代理冲突.This paper explores the effects of convertible bonds and private benefits of control rights on investment decisions and agency costs.By establishing a real option model and based on equilibrium pricing principle,the option value of investment,optimal investment strategy and the agency costs of controlling shareholders are analyzed and calculated.The results show that compared with the straight debt,convertible bonds can significantly increase the controlling shareholders’option value,but reduce the firm value simultaneously.The controlling shareholders tend to use the convertible bond financing,but the firm tends to use straight debt financing from the perspective of social welfare maximization.In addition,the convertible bond not only effectively curbs the over-investment behavior of controlling shareholders,but also significantly eases the agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and small and medium-sized investors.

关 键 词：控制权私利 可转债 最优投资决策 代理冲突 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]