产业市场化的进程:不同市场结构行为差异  被引量:1

The Process of Industrial Marketization: Differences in Market Structure and Conduct

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作  者:刘小玄[1,2] 段继红 XIAOXUAN LIU;JIHONG DUAN(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences;Nanjing University of Finance&Economics)

机构地区:[1]中国社会科学院经济研究所 [2]山东大学 [3]南京财经大学经济学院

出  处:《产业经济评论》2022年第3期83-100,共18页Review of Industrial Economics

摘  要:依据中国改革开放以来的长期价格指数和产业数据,本文分析了产业市场化的发展进程,试图发现价格变化机制背后的市场结构和行为差异。竞争产业及相应市场上的企业是价格接受者,垄断产业及相应市场上的企业是价格制定者,这两者分别代表了两种不同的机制,即市场决定还是行政力量决定的双轨系统。这样的双轨机制导致了为实现市场均衡的两种行为,即行政力量控制下的市场行为,和竞争企业面临的“内卷”或“恶性竞争”行为。本文的研究为这样的双轨机制提供了经验研究的基础。中国经济的生态本质上源于这种机制,各种经济的不平衡现象,例如房地产业和制造业之间、上下游产业、金融与实体经济之间,其根源都在于此,因而会拖累整体经济的公平和有效率的发展。This paper analyzes the development of industrial marketization based on the long-term price index and industrial data since China’s reform and opening, and tries to find the differences in market structure and behavior behind the price mechanism. The firms in the competitive markets and industries are price takers, and the firms in monopoly markets and industries are price makers, which represent two different mechanisms, namely a dual-track system of market decisions and administrative decisions. Such a dual-track mechanism has led to two kinds of behaviors to achieve market equilibrium,namely market behaviors under the control of administrative power, and “inner volume” or “vicious competition” behaviors faced by competitive enterprises. Our study provides a basis for empirical research on such a dual-track mechanism. The ecology of the Chinese economy essentially stems from this mechanism. Various economic imbalances, such as between real estate and manufacturing, upstream and downstream industries, and finance and the real economy, come from the mechanism,which will drag down the fair and efficient development of the overall economy.

关 键 词:市场化 产业经济 竞争 垄断 市场壁垒分割 双轨机制 

分 类 号:F421[经济管理—产业经济]

 

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