基于演化博弈的区域污染协同治理研究  

The Study of Coordinated Pollution Control at the Regional Level based on the Evolutionary Game

作　　者：郑菊花[1] 柴泽阳 申伟宁 ZHENG Ju-hua;CHAI Ze-yang;SHEN Wei-ning(School of Business,Luoyang Normal University,Luoyang Henan 471934,China;School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Normal University,Chongqing 401331,China;Chongqing Development Institute,Chongqing 401331,China;School of Public Administration,Hebei University of Economics and Business,Shijiazhuang Hebei 050061,China)

机构地区：[1]洛阳师范学院商学院,河南洛阳471934 [2]重庆师范大学经济与管理学院,重庆401331 [3]重庆发展研究院,重庆401331 [4]河北经贸大学公共管理学院,河北石家庄050061

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2022年第6期117-122,共6页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(19CJL027);河北省科技计划软科学研究专项资助项目(215576106D);河北省高等学校科学研究项目(SD2022011);河北经贸大学京津冀协同发展科研专项项目(JXT2020YB05)。

摘　　要：环境治理的联防联控联治是实现区域环境质量整体提升的有效机制。文章基于演化博弈理论,构建了地区间的环境治理演化博弈模型,分析了协同治理机制的污染治理效应。研究表明:成本收益比仍然是影响地方政府参与协同治污的重要因素,成本收益比越小,地方政府越有动机维系彼此间的协同关系;通过设定惩戒机制,增加违背协同的机会成本,有利于维持各方之间的协同治污关系;较大的污染物空间溢出性会导致地方政府采取“搭便车”的策略,最终使得协同群体陷入污染治理的囚徒困境。The joint prevention,control and coordinated governance are effective mechanisms to improve the overall quality of the regional environment.Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper introduces the evolutionary game model of environmental control among regions and analyzes the pollution control effect of a collaborative governance mechanism.The study shows that:The cost-benefit ratio is still an important factor affecting local governments'participation in coordinated pollution control,and the more smaller cost-benefit ratio is,the more willing the local governments are to maintain coordinated relationship with each other.By establishing disciplinary mechanisms to increase the opportunity cost of breaching synergies,it is conducive to maintaining a collaborative anti-pollution relation-ship between all parties.The large spatial spillage of pollutants will lead local governments to adopt a"free-ride"strategy,which will eventually lead the groups trap in the prisoner's dilemma of pollution control.

关 键 词：演化博弈 环境污染 协同治理 数值模拟 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]