范畴性所与的神话  

The Myth of the Categorial Given

作　　者：苏瑞 SU Rui(School of Philosophy,Heilongjiang University,Harbin 150080,China)

机构地区：[1]黑龙江大学哲学院,哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2022年第3期33-38,共6页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年项目“麦克道尔经验论、语言哲学、道德哲学三重统一思想研究”(HDYJW201811)。

摘　　要：在麦克道尔所遭受的众多批评中,比较有趣,同时也比较严厉的一种观点认为,他对感觉经验的自然主义构想会落入塞拉斯所抨击的一类最为深刻的所与神话,即范畴性所与的神话。在对这种批评的回应中,占据其核心的是麦克道尔对意向性概念的阐释,他强调自己对这一概念的理解比塞拉斯更能够保留先验哲学的要义。然而我们认为,麦克道尔依据这一概念对批判的回应非但无法自圆其说,甚至更加印证了范畴性所与在其哲学思辨中根深蒂固的吸引力。McDowell’s empiricism has been criticized by many scholars.Among these criticisms,there is one that is the most interesting and severe.According to this view,his naturalistic conception of sensory experience falls into one of the most profound Categorial Given that Sellars attacks.At the heart of McDowell’s responses is his conception of intentionality,which he stresses is more capable of preserving the core of transcendental philosophy compared to Sellars.However,we believe that McDowell’s response not only fails to justify itself,but also confirms the deep-rooted power of Categorial Given in the tradition of philosophical speculation.

关 键 词：范畴 所与 知性 规范性 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]