道德物化还是道德直觉物化?  

Moralizing Technology or Materializing Moral Intuition?

作　　者：周雪健 ZHOU Xue-jian(School of Marxism,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学马克思主义学院,沈阳110169

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2022年第3期64-68,共5页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

摘　　要：维贝克的道德物化理论强调技术人工物有道德规范性,能够以一种直接的方式影响人的道德判断,打破了传统的技术伦理范式。维贝克进一步认为技术人工物能够有意向性和自由,道德物化的批评者们则认为维贝克对道德的定义不够严谨,也没有可行性。然而,道德物化实际上轻视了技术主体的道德责任,进而忽略道德直觉的意义。从某种程度上来看,道德直觉在技术实践中应用更为广泛和深刻,所以道德物化毋宁说是道德直觉物化。而福柯提出的“自我技术”可以成为道德直觉物化的反思性视角乃至超越的途径。Peter-Paul Verbeek’s moralizing technology emphasizes that technical artifacts can have moral normativity in order to break with traditional ethical paradigms,and influence human moral judgement in a direct way in the contemporary high-tech environment.Verbeek goes on to argue that technical artifacts are capable of intentionality and freedom.Critics of moralizing technology have argued that Verbeek’s definition of morality is not sufficiently rigorous or viable.Moralizing technology effectively ignores the moral responsibility of the technological subject,and thus neglects the significance of moral intuition.In a way,moral intuitions are more widely and deeply used in technological activities,so moralizing technology is rather materializing moral intuitions.The“technologies of the self”proposed by Foucault can be a reflective perspective and even a way to transcend the moralizing technology.

关 键 词：维贝克 道德物化 道德直觉 自我技术 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]