卢埃林法律现实主义的两个命题及其批判  被引量:2

Two Propositions of Llewellyn s Legal Realism and Their Criticism

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作  者:罗有成 Luo Youcheng

机构地区:[1]西南政法大学行政法学院 [2]西南政法大学全面依法治国研究院

出  处:《南大法学》2022年第3期160-174,共15页NanJing University Law Journal

基  金:国家社会科学基金重点项目“中国法理学研究70年回理与评析”(19AFX002)的阶段性成果。

摘  要:卢埃林的法律现实主义理论可归纳为实质性命题和形式性命题。实质性命题主张法律不是一套规则而是一套事实,形式性命题主张法律科学不是理性科学而是经验科学。但这两个命题并没有充分理解规则之治中蕴含的价值理性问题。实质性命题夸大了“自由法论题”,忽略了规则背后的实质性理由,也必然与“休谟法则”相悖。形式性命题没有明确论证“纯粹”的经验事实何以可能,也在一定程度上混淆了解释与证立,并由此可能会对一般性规范造成伤害。尽管卢埃林后来所诉诸的“宏大风格”司法裁判理论能够得出与社会习俗相符的判决结果,但由于没有经过实质性价值理念的定性审查,其背后仍存在将价值归咎于社会事实的风险,在应用于司法裁判实践中会遭遇可行性与可欲性难题。规则之治的运作不只是形式内容单独发挥作用,而同时涉及了价值理性的参与,它们之间相互制衡、相互促进的关系,为司法裁判提供了一个富有张力的动力机制。Llewellyn s legal realism theory can be summarized into substantive proposition and formal proposition.Substantive proposition holds that law is not a set of rules but a set of facts,and formal proposition holds that legal science is not a rational science but an empirical science.However,these two propositions do not fully understand the problem of value rationality contained in the rule of rules.The substantive proposition exaggerates the“topic of free law”,ignores the substantive reasons behind the rules,and is bound to be contrary to“Hume s law”.Formal propositions do not clearly demonstrate the possibility of“pure”empirical facts,but also confuse interpretation and justification to a certain extent,which may cause harm to general norms.Although the“grand style”judicial judgment theory that Llewellyn later resorted to can get the judgment results consistent with social customs,there is still a risk of attributing the value to social facts because it has not been qualitatively reviewed by the substantive value concept,and it will encounter problems of feasibility and desirability in the application of judicial judgment practice.The operation of rule of rules is not only the form and content playing a role alone,but also involves the participation of value rationality.The relationship between them checks,balances and promotes each other,providing a tension dynamic mechanism for judicial adjudication.

关 键 词:卢埃林 法律现实主义 规则之治 司法裁判 法官行为 

分 类 号:D909[政治法律—法学理论] D916[政治法律—法学]

 

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