有限理性下种群博弈中合作均衡的稳定性  

The Stability of Cooperative Equilibria for Population Games Under Bounded Rationality

作　　者：张海群 ZHANG HAIQUN(School of International Economics and Trade,Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai 201209,China)

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计金融学院国际经贸学院,上海201209

出　　处：《应用数学学报》2022年第3期432-447,共16页Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica

摘　　要：本文首先定义了理性函数,构造了有限理性模型,研究了有限理性下种群博弈NTU核的稳定性;其次,又进一步定义了种群博弈另一种合作均衡即强均衡的概念,并且采用类似的方法研究了有限理性下该强均衡的稳定性.研究结果表明:在我们所构造的有限理性模型框架下,对大多数的种群博弈(在Baire分类意义下)其NTU核和强均衡都是稳定的.In this paper,we first construct a bounded rationality model by defining a rational function,and study the stability of the NTU core for population games under bounded rationality.We next introduce the concept of another cooperative equilibrium for population games,that is strong equilibrium.Moreover,by using the similar method,we study the stability of the strong equilibria under the bounded rationality.Our result shows that the NTU core and strong equilibria of most of population games in the sense of Baire category are stable under our framework of the bounded rationality models.

关 键 词：种群博弈 合作均衡 有限理性 支付函数 稳定性 

分 类 号：O177.91[理学—数学]