基于博弈理论的等保测评机构监管仿真研究  

Research on Supervision Strategy of Cybersecurity Assessment AgencyBased on Game Theory

作　　者：庄严 ZHUANG Yan(Network Information Center,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei Anhui 230026,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学网络信息中心,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《计算机仿真》2022年第5期273-277,共5页Computer Simulation

基　　金：国家重点研发计划项目(2020YFA0309702)。

摘　　要：测评机构监管是保证等级保护工作健康有序持续发展的重要内容。基于博弈视角,构建监管部门和测评机构的策略选择模型,通过仿真方法分析双方策略选择的稳定性,研究监管部门策略参数对测评机构测评质量的影响。仿真结果表明现有监管机制下,监管部门和测评机构之间难以形成稳定的策略选择状态,过度强调攻防竞赛类工作会对测评质量造成负面影响,需引入动态的处罚力度等方式来提高监管效果,仿真结果为监管部门合理分配资源、选择监管策略提供思路和参考。The supervision of cybersecurity assessment agencies is an important element of cybersecurity classified protection.Based on the game theory,this paper built a strategy model between the supervision department and the assessment agency,analyzed the stability of the two sides’ strategy selection through simulation method,and studied the influence of the supervision’s strategy parameters on the assessment agency.The simulation results show that under the existing regulatory mechanism,a stable state of strategy selection cannot be formed between the regulatory department and the assessment agencies,and over-emphasis on offensive and defensive exercises will negatively affect the quality of assessment,and dynamic penalties and other methods need to be introduced to achieve the regulatory purpose.The results provide references for the supervisory department to reasonably allocate resources and select the supervision strategy.

关 键 词：等保测评机构 监管策略 仿真分析 博弈理论 

分 类 号：TP391.9[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]