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作 者:赵明[1] ZHAO Ming(Department of Management Engineering,Anhui Communications Vocational and Technical College,Hefei 230001,China)
机构地区:[1]安徽交通职业技术学院管理工程系,安徽合肥230001
出 处:《陕西理工大学学报(自然科学版)》2022年第3期69-76,共8页Journal of Shaanxi University of Technology:Natural Science Edition
基 金:安徽省高校人文社会科学重点项目(SK2020A0814)。
摘 要:针对单个上下游企业组成的两产品供应链,分别构建了上游技术垄断和上下游技术竞争等两种研发模式下的三阶段非合作博弈模型,得到了两种情形下的企业最优研发和定价策略。研究结果表明:批发价和零售价都与产品自身的研发水平正相关,与竞争品的研发水平负相关;与技术垄断相比,当下游企业研发能力较弱时,技术竞争会导致自主研发产品的研发水平和零售价下降,非自主研发产品的研发水平提高,研发能力比较强时则恰好相反;技术竞争也提高了两产品的单位净收益、下游企业和供应链总利润、消费者剩余和社会总福利,但上游企业利润减少了。最后给出了技术竞争下的供应链协调策略。Aiming at the two-product supply chain composed of a single upstream and downstream enterprise,this paper constructs the three-stage non cooperative game models based on upstream technology monopoly and technology competition between upstream and downstream respectively.The results show that;the wholesale price and retail price are positively related to the R&D level of the product itself and negatively related to the R&D level of the competitive product;compared with technology monopoly,when the R&D ability of the downstream is relatively weak,technology competition will lead to the decline of the R&D level and retail price of the self-developed product and the improvement of the R&D level of the non independent R&D product,and when the R&D ability is relatively strong,it will be just the opposite.Technology competition also improves the unit net income of the two products,increase the profit on the downstream and supply chain.And it also benefits consumer surplus and social welfare,but decreases the upstream’s profits.Finally,we give the supply chain coordination strategy under technology competition.
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