重复博弈、复合竞争与中印边界的互动态势  

Repeated Games,Complex Competition and Dynamics on the Sino-India Border

作　　者：曹鹏鹏 冯怀信 Cao Pengpeng;Feng Huaixin

机构地区：[1]南京大学国际关系学院 [2]新疆大学政治与公共管理学院 [3]新疆大学中亚地缘政治研究中心

出　　处：《南亚研究》2022年第2期63-85,158,共24页South Asian Studies

摘　　要：中印边界争端问题并非纯粹的领土主张,而是掺杂着多重现实性因素。重复博弈理论认为,边界争端因存在长期利益导向与“一报还一报”的理性报复策略,最终将走向一种可预期的稳定合作。重复博弈理论大致解释了1962年中印边界战争后,两国冲突烈度持续降低的基本逻辑。然而,近年来中印在边界区域的争端频率和烈度有所上升,尤其是2020年中印在加勒万河谷地带发生流血冲突后一段时间,双方保持着紧张对峙的态势。本文研究发现,中印受地位竞争、地缘空间竞争和与美国互动的复合竞争影响,导致印度产生本体性不安全。印度需要增加在边界问题上对中国的威慑力度,以消解其在边界对峙中的被动地位。The Sino-India border conflict is much more complicated than simple competing territorial claims,and instead is rooted in a complex set of realistic factors.According to the theory of repeated games,border conflicts tend over the long-term towards predictable and stable cooperation as rational players understand the implications of following a retaliatory strategy of tit-for-tat.The theory of repeated games roughly explains the basic logic that India and China followed in gradually de-escalating the border conflict following the 1962border war.While so,in recent years the frequency and intensity of conflict in the China-India border region has increased,especially since 2020 when a violent conflict broke out in the Galwan Valley,leading to an ongoing standoff between the two countries.This study finds that because of complex competition around the respective status of India and China,and related to their geo-strategic space,as well as due to dynamics vis-à-vis the United States,India has started to experience a form of ontological insecurity.If India wants to overcome its current passive position vis-à-vis the border standoff,it needs to enhance its deterrence vis-à-vis China.

关 键 词：重复博弈 边界争端 复合竞争 本体性不安全 中印边界 

分 类 号：D823[政治法律—政治学] D822.335.1[政治法律—外交学]