Existence of Weakly Cooperative Equilibria for Infinite-Leader-Infinite-Follower Games  

作　　者：Zhe Yang Qing-Bin Gong 

机构地区：[1]School of Economics,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China [2]SUFE Key Laboratory of Mathematical Economics,Ministry of Education,Shanghai 200433,China

出　　处：《Journal of the Operations Research Society of China》2019年第4期643-654,共12页中国运筹学会会刊（英文）

基　　金：This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.11501349);Graduate Innovation Foundation sponsored by Shanghai University of Finance and Economics(No.CXJJ-2017-375).

摘　　要：In this paper,we first generalize Yang and Ju’s(J Glob Optim 65:563–573,2016)result in Hausdorff topological vector spaces.Second,we introduce the model of leader-follower games with infinitely many leaders and followers,that is,infiniteleader-infinite-follower game.We next introduce the notion of weakly cooperative equilibria for infinite-leader-infinite-follower games and prove the existence result.

关 键 词：(Weakly)cooperative equilibrium Infinite-leader-infinite-follower game EXISTENCE 

分 类 号：O17[理学—数学]