A Cost-Sharing Scheme for the k-Level Facility Location Game with Penalties  

作　　者：Feng-Min Wang Jia-Jia Wang Na Li Yan-Jun Jiang Shi-Cheng Li 

机构地区：[1]Beijing Jinghang Research Institute of Computing and Communication,Beijing 100074,China [2]School of Mathematics and Statistics Science,Ludong University,Yantai 264025,Shandong,China [3]The Classified Information Carrier Safety Management Engineering Technology Research Center of Beijing,Beijing 100074,China

出　　处：《Journal of the Operations Research Society of China》2022年第1期173-182,共10页中国运筹学会会刊（英文）

基　　金：This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.11901544 and 11801251).

摘　　要：In the k-level facility location problem with penalties,each client will be either serviced or rejected completely.And if the client is planned to be serviced,then it must be connected to a sequence of k different kinds of facilities located in k levels of hierarchy.The total cost including the facility cost,connection cost and penalty cost will be jointly paid by all the clients.In the corresponding game of the k-level facility location problem with penalties,called the k-level facility location game with penalties,the total cost should be allocated to different clients.This work set out a cost-sharing scheme for the k-level facility location game with penalties that is cross-monotonic,competitive,and the approximate cost recovery is 6.

关 键 词：Cost-sharing scheme Cross-monotonic COMPETITIVE k-level facility location game 

分 类 号：O22[理学—运筹学与控制论]