基于多边缔约博弈的地方政府联合发债机制设计  

The Joint Liability Mechanism Design of Local Government Bond Issuance Based on Multilateral Contracting Game

作　　者：麦丽斯 MAI Lisi(School of Finance,University of International Busiriess and Economics,Beijing 100029,China)

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学金融学院,北京100029

出　　处：《内蒙古大学学报（自然科学版）》2022年第3期246-252,共7页Journal of Inner Mongolia University：Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(61962041,62062053)资助。

摘　　要：基于不对称信息下的多边缔约博弈理论,采用隐藏行动下的多边缔约机制设计方法,对联合发债合约达成贝叶斯均衡的条件以及帕累托改进效果进行了具体分析,模型结果显示,该机制可以在强调内部监督的同时有效避免地方债自发自还造成的效率低下,从而弥补宏观治理难以改善地方债公开市场道德风险的缺陷,并在微观机制上进一步约束搭便车问题。Based on the multilateral game theory under asymmetric information,by mechanism design method of multilateral contract for hidden action issues,the paper analyzes the bayesian equilibrium conditions and the pareto improvement effects.The results show that when dealing with local government debt,the mechanism can effectively avoid the inefficiency caused by excessive borrowing while enhance endogenous supervision.And it makes up for the defects that macro-governance cannot alleviate the moral hazard in the open local government bond market,constrains the free-riding problems furtherly.

关 键 词：不完全信息博弈 子博弈精炼纳什均衡 地方债道德风险 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] F224.32[理学—数学]