基于双重委托代理理论的创新补贴“内卷”研究  

A Study on The Dilemma of Government Innovation Subsidies“in-rolling”Based on Dual Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：侯贵生[1] 神琪 宋于心 HOU Gui-sheng;SHEN Qi;SONG Yu-xin(College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266590, China;School of Mathematics and Statistics,University of New South Wales,Sydney NSW 2052 Australia)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266590 [2]新南威尔士大学数学与统计学院,澳大利亚新南威尔士州2052

出　　处：《商业研究》2022年第3期12-23,共12页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目,项目编号:20FJYB031。

摘　　要：近年创新补贴陷入“内卷”困局,如何提高创新补贴利用效率、抑制“创新泡沫”需要技术创新企业、地方政府、中央政府的共同参与。基于双重委托代理理论,构建技术创新企业、地方政府、中央政府三方演化博弈模型,探讨“三赢”均衡策略。研究发现:技术创新企业、地方政府、中央政府三者行为相互影响;核查成功率、监管成本是影响中央、地方政府策略选择的重要因素;合理的政企契约、“央地”契约可以促进补贴公平;政府自身定位的差异决定了选择策略的差异;降低信息不对称,创新补贴监管共治模式,评价专利价值由“结果导向”转变为“过程导向”可以减少“骗补”行为。In recent years,innovation subsidies have become“involuted”.How to improve the efficiency of innovation subsidies,and how to shatter the current“innovation bubble”requires the joint participation of technology innovation enterprises,local governments,and the central government.Based on the dual principal-agent theory,this study builds an evolutionary game model among technology innovation enterprises,local governments and the central government to explore the“three-win”equilibrium among game players.It is found that:the behavior of technology innovation enterprises,local governments and central governments affect each other.The success rate of verification and the cost of regulation are significant factors influencing the choice of strategies of central and local governments.And reasonable government-enterprise contract and central-local contract could promote the fairness of subsidies;the different positioning of the government itself determines the difference in the choice of strategies.And reducing the information asymmetry,innovating the co governance mode of subsidy supervision,and changing the evaluation of patent value from“result oriented”to“process oriented”can reduce the“fraud compensation”behavior.

关 键 词：创新补贴 骗补 双重委托代理 地方政府 中央政府 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F273.1