敌意收购规制模式的错位及其改造  

The dislocation and reform of the regulatory mode of hostile takeover

作　　者：史欣媛 SHI Xinyuan(Law School,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,P.R.China)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学法学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第3期254-268,共15页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：2021年教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“比例原则在经济法中的适用研究”(21YJC820033);2020年国家社会科学基金重大研究专项“社会主义核心价值观融入行业规章体系建设的法治路径研究”(20VHJ007);2021年国家社会科学基金青年项目“系统性风险防范下金融科技反垄断规制研究”(21CFX082)。

摘　　要：当前我国在实践中呈现出的“证监会监管,辅之以司法介入”的管制型敌意收购规制模式表现失灵,具体表征为行政机关的监管被动和草率,以及司法机关的应对乏力。究其根源,在于我国敌意收购规制模式出现了结构性错位。法律规制模式可被解构为管制型、自治型和回应型三种类型,其中,回应型规制乃敌意收购法律规制的应然模式。这是因为,敌意收购具有天然的不确定性和复杂性,因而灵活、及时的回应型立改废规则或法官创新性裁判与敌意收购达成契合。是故,我国应当实现敌意收购管制型规制模式向回应型规制模式的转型。在比较法视野下,回应型规制模式呈现出司法型和自律型两种类型,后者又可被划分为完全自律型和不完全自律型两种模式。迈向敌意收购的不完全自律型法律规制模式乃我国最优选择,原因如下:第一,司法体制改革的成本和阻碍较大,转型为真正的司法型规制模式较为艰难;第二,我国缺乏机构投资者,不具备完全自律型规制模式的形成基础;第三,自律型规制模式还存在缺乏强制力的固有弊端。具体而言,我国可借鉴英国和澳大利亚经验,构建一个具有中国特色的敌意收购不完全自律型规制范式。首先,应确立促进社会整体福利的共同利益诉求。在此理念指引下,我国可构建一个以证监会牵头,以证券交易所、中小投资者服务中心、证券公司、基金公司、律师协会、会计师协会等为核心成员的并购小组。其次,构建促进实体正义的制度框架。一是为分工明确并形成内部约束,建议在并购小组内部设立多个具有不同职能和权力的委员会;二是并购小组在作决定过程中不应拘泥于法律法规,而是灵活采用多元化决定方法。最后,塑造程序主义运作规范体系。一是规则制定程序应体现灵活性与民主性,明确规则委员会在特殊情形下可以随�Currently,the repressive regulatory mode of hostile takeover in China—“supervised by the Securities Regulatory Commission,supplemented by judicial intervention”shows failure,which is specifically characterized by the passive and hasty supervision of administrative organs and the weak response of judicial organs.The reason is the structural dislocation of the regulation mode of hostile takeover in China.The legal regulation mode can be deconstructed into three types:the repressive regulatory mode,the autonomy regulatory mode and the responsive regulatory mode.Among them,the responsive regulatory mode ought to be the mode of legal regulation of hostile takeover.This is because hostile takeover has natural uncertainty and complexity,while flexible and timely responsive legislation,reform and abolition rules or judges’innovative judgment can respond to the demands of hostile takeover.Therefore,the regulation mode of hostile takeover in China should transform from the repressive regulatory mode to the responsive regulatory mode.From the perspective of comparative law,the responsive regulatory mode presents two types:judicial regulatory mode and self-regulatory mode,and the latter can be divided into two types:complete self-regulatory mode and incomplete self-regulatory mode.In China,moving towards the incomplete self-regulatory mode is the better choice,and the reasons are as follows:firstly,the cost and obstacles of judicial system reform are large,and it is difficult to transform into a real judicial regulatory mode.Secondly,there are very few institutional investors in China,which makes the basis for the formation of complete self-regulatory mode not available.Thirdly,the complete self-regulatory mode has the inherent disadvantages of lack of coercive force.Specifically,China can learn from the experience of Britain and Australia to build an incomplete self-regulatory mode with Chinese characteristics.First of all,the common interest demands to promote the overall welfare of the society should be establishe

关 键 词：敌意收购 管制型规制模式 回应型规制模式 不完全自律型规制模式 并购小组 

分 类 号：D922.287[政治法律—经济法学] D926[政治法律—法学] D922.291