晋升博弈下的县级政府策略性竞争——基于浙江省数据的实证  

Strategic Competition of County-level Governments under Promotion Game:Evidence from Zhejiang Province

作　　者：陆军[1] 蔡思远 臧天宇 LU Jun;CAI SiYuan;ZANG TianYu(Peking University,Beijing 100871;Beijing Jinqiu Private Equity Fund Management Co.,Ltd.,Beijing 102407)

机构地区：[1]北京大学政府管理学院,北京100871 [2]北京锦秋私募基金管理有限公司,北京102407

出　　处：《财贸研究》2022年第5期1-14,共14页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“规模借用驱动中国都市圈多重循环网络与治理优化研究”(42171174)。

摘　　要：基于2009—2018年浙江省县级面板数据和官员简历数据,从工业用地出让和教育支出的视角,利用两区域空间杜宾模型对晋升锦标赛模型进行检验。结果表明:县级政府间的工业用地出让规模和教育支出水平均存在显著的空间竞争关系;这种竞争所表现出的具体特征与中国的行政组织形式和官员考核规则相契合。由此,可以认为,晋升锦标赛模型较好地再现了中国地方政治生态,但GDP并非晋升考量的唯一指标。Based on the county-level panel data and officials’resume data of Zhejiang province from 2009-2018,from perspectives of industrial land leasing and education expenditure,this paper tests the promotion tournament model by employing a two-regime spatial Durbin model.The results show that there is clear spatial competition relationship between the scale of industrial land lease and education expenditure among county governments.The specific characteristics of the competition are consistent with China’s administrative organization form and officials’performance appraisal rules.Therefore,the promotion tournament model can be considered as a good representation of local political ecology in China,but GDP is not the only criteria for promotion.

关 键 词：工业用地出让 教育支出 县级政府 晋升锦标赛 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学] F224